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Conjuring is the only absolutely honest profession: a
conjurorpromises to deceive and does.
- Karl Germain, lawyer and magician'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last few years, we have seen a number of financial stories
discussing corporate America's trickery, many using magic terms such
as "sleight of hand," "hocus-pocus," and "trickery."2 In one news
' STUART CRAMER, GERMAIN THE WIZARD 237 (2002). Germain the Wizard

(also known as Karl Germain) (1878-1959), whose real name was Charles W.
Mattmueller, Jr., was a prominent magician in the 1910s who gave up the magic
profession to become a practicing lawyer. Germain had a magic pupil late in his life
and requested that his pupil never divulge the secrets that Germain revealed to him,
even making the threatening statement: "If you ever write anything about me after I
am gone, I will come back and haunt you." Id. at 31. Fortunately for the magic
profession, Germain's pupil, Stuart Cramer (1911-2003), did not honor his mentor's
wishes. Shortly after Germain's death in 1959, Cramer published several books about
Germain, thereby allowing future generations of magicians to realize the brilliance of
his mentor.
See, e.g., STUART CRAMER, GERMAIN THE WIZARD AND His
LEGERDEMAIN (1966); STUART CRAMER, THE SECRETS OF KARL GERMAIN (1962).
There has been a resurgence of interest in Germain the Wizard with the
publication in 2002 of Cramer's third book on Germain, entitled simply GERMAIN
THE WIZARD.

2 See, e.g., David Henry & Marcia Vickers, Whipsawed by Wall Street, Bus.
WK., Mar. 10, 2003, at 55 ("Earnings surprises - and consequent lurches in stocks are likely to become much more common as U.S. and international regulators change
accounting rules in an effort to discourage corporate hocus-pocus."); Jonathan
Peterson, Scandals Keep Many Wary of Wall Street; LingeringDistrust in the Financial
System Could Hurt Bush in the PresidentialCampaign, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2004, at
Al ("More than two years after Enron Corp. became an emblem of corporate fraud
and trickery, opinion surveys show that throughout the nation the public's faith in the
financial system remains shaken...."); James Surowiecki, Aim High, THE NEW
YORKER, Sept. 22, 2003, at 90 (describing the Air Force's accounting practices as the
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story published in the New York Times, the author writes that "even
David Copperfield could learn a trick or two from some of the true
masters of illusion: the financial wizards on Wall Street and in
corporate America."3 Numerous books and financial articles have
discussed the trickery at corporate giants, such as Enron, WorldCom,
and Global Crossing.4 For example, in one financial story, the author
writes that "It]he true extent of this dodge [tax avoidance] has not
been disclosed, except for sleight of hand like this: Using deductions
for stock options, the company [Enron] turned a $112-million tax
liability into a $278-million refund."5
Although financial writers have been using magic terms in
describing tax law (and accounting reporting), do such terms and
theories really have a place in the law? This Article will show that
there is a connection between magic and tax law.6 A theory in magic
known as the Too Perfect Theory, which has been present in magic
circles for many years and has recently had a resurgence in popularity,
is applicable to tax law.
The Too Perfect Theory has been interpreted to mean that a
magic trick may be too perfect, in that not only does it not fool the
audience, but the effect itself may lead the audience to discover how
the trick is performed.
A number of prominent magicians have
"kind of sleight of hand that corporate America indulged in during the nineties, to its

enduring embarrassment").
3 Kurt Eichenwald, Just a Little Abracadabra and How Those Numbers
Fall
into Place,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, § 3, at 9.
4 See, e.g., LYNNE W. JETER, DISCONNECTED: DECEIT AND
BETRAYAL AT
WORLDCOM (2003); BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN
THE ROOM: THE

AMAZING RISE

AND SCANDALOUS FALL

OF ENRON

(2003);

REBECCA SMITH & JOHN R. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS (2003); Joshua Chaffin, Global

Crossing Hires Outside Auditor; Telecommunications Bankrupt CarrierPlans Special
Committee and Appoints Firm to Review Matters SEC is Investigating, FIN. TIMES,

Feb. 5, 2002, at 28; Daniel Kadlec, WorldCon; Nailed for the Biggest Bookkeeping
Deception in History, a Fallen Telecom Giant Gives Investors One More Reason to
Doubt Corporate Integrity, TIME, July 8, 2002, at 20; Anne Tergesen, Cash-Flow
Hocus-Pocus, Bus. WK., July 15, 2002, at 130.
5

John Balzar, Only Suckers Pay Taxes, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, at M5.

6 There have been articles written on the deceptive nature of tax lawyers
but

they do not involve theories in magic being applied to tax law. See, e.g., Calvin H.
Johnson, Seeking Shelter: Opportunity Lost in Pleasant Summit, 47 TAX NOTES 1009

(1990); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis - The Fairies, the Magic Circle, and
Partnership Options, 90 TAX NOTES 721 (2001); Steven J. Willis, Masks, Magic and
Games: The Use of Tax Law as a Policy Tool, 4 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 41 (1985).

See Rick Johnsson, The "Too Perfect" Theory, HIEROPHANT, Fall 1970-Spring
1971, at 247-50.
7
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written about and debated the Too Perfect Theory, with most
agreeing with the theory and a small minority disagreeing with it for
various reasons.8 What is interesting about the Too Perfect Theory is
that it seems to be applicable to the law, particularly the practice of
transactional law, such as tax law. In other words, is it possible for a
transaction to be structured in which the results are too perfect under
the tax law? Most judges, law academics, lawyers, and law students
would immediately respond, "Absolutely not." They would claim that
transactional lawyers strive for perfection and anything less may lead
to malpractice claims. But, as this Article will show, a transaction may
have results that are too perfect under the tax law, and, as a result, the
transaction may be subject to recharacterization by the government
and the courts. 9
The first part of this Article will describe in detail the Too Perfect
Theory in the area in which it originated: the field of magic or
conjuring." The second part of this Article will apply the theory to an
area of transactional law in which perfection has always been seen as
the goal of the lawyer: tax law. 1 In the field of tax law, any mistake in
structuring a transaction can lead to disastrous tax consequences. This
is probably most prevalent in the area of international tax law, in
which no less an authority than Professor James Eustice has written,
"[T]o be wrong here [international tax] is to court tax disasters on a

8 See, e.g.,

SIMON ARONSON, THE ARONSON APPROACH 172 (1990); MICHAEL

CLOSE, WORKERS, NUMBER 3, at 84-88 (1993); PETER LAMONT & RICHARD
WISEMAN, MAGIC IN THEORY 97 (1999) (noting that the theory is "controversial");
STEPHEN MINCH, KEN KRENZEL'S INGENUITIES ix (1997) ("Here I am in accord with

Juan Tamariz, Tommy Wonder and others who maintain that the goal to be sought is
one of absolute, clueless bewilderment."); 2 TOMMY WONDER & STEPHEN MINCH,
THE BOOKS OF WONDER 319 (1996) ("This theory has been rather widely accepted, is

applied quite a bit by some, and is unfortunately gaining in popularity."); John
Carney, The Flaw in the Diamond, GENII: THE CONJURORS' MAG., Aug. 2001, at 59-

62; Michael Close, A Worker's Take on "Too Perfect," GENII: THE CONJURORS' MAC.,
Aug. 2001, at 62-64; Martin Lewis, Find a Better Method, GENII: THE CONJURORS'
MAG., Aug. 2001, at 67; Harry Lorayne, It's Your Call: On the Too-Perfect Theory,
GENII: THE CONJURORS' MAO., Aug. 2001, at 68-70; Darwin Ortiz, Striving for
Perfection, GENII: THE CONJURORS' MAG., Aug. 2001, at 64-67; Jon Racherbaumer,
The Too Perfect Theory: Thirty Years Later, GENII: THE CONJURORS' MAO., Aug.

2001, at 48-57; Jamy Ian Swiss, The Too Perfect Theory in Action, GENII: THE
CONJURORS' MAG., Aug. 2001, at 57-59; Patrick Watson, Assenting to the
Inexplicable, GENII: THE CONJURORS' MAO., Aug. 2001, at 67-68.
9 See infra notes 84-109 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra notes 16-83 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 84-222 and accompanying text.
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scale rarely encountered on the home front.' 2 In this Article, the
conventional wisdom of perfection in structuring transactions for tax
purposes will be questioned, with examples from both domestic and
international tax law. In the final parts of the Article, the Too Perfect
Theory will be analyzed in the context of common transactions." An
analysis of current practice will reveal that, while almost all tax
advisors are intuitively aware of the Too Perfect Theory, many of
them have violated it.
It may seem odd for a law professor to be interested in magic.
However, the legal profession's fascination with conjuring goes back
hundreds of years, and it appears to be more prevalent today than
ever, with such noted judges as Alex Kozinski and Stephen Trott of
the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit being avid
S
14
magic enthusiasts.
Conjurors are also fascinated by the law; for
example, one of the best conjurors in the world, England's Guy
Hollingworth, has given up the profession of conjuring to pursue a law
degree and become a barrister."

" James S. Eustice, Foreword to 1 JOEL D. KuNTz & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION v (2002).
" See infra notes 223-281 and accompanying text.
See Kevin Livingston, Attorney Can Pull a Rabbit Out of his Hat - Literally,
THE RECORDER, Feb. 28,2000, at 5.
Angelo J. Lewis (1839-1919), who wrote under the pen name of Professor
Hoffmann, is often considered to be the greatest author of conjuring textbooks.
14

Lewis wrote MODERN MAGIC (1876), MORE MAGIC (1890), and LATER MAGIC

(1904), still regarded as three of the greatest magic books ever written. He also wrote
two books on law: THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (1870) and THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1871).
See THOMAS A. SAWYER, PROFESSOR HOFFMANN: A
BIBLIOGRAPHY 13 (1983).

Lewis was an amateur magician and an Oxford-educated barrister who used a
pen name because "[he] didn't expect that it would do a practising barrister any good
to pose as the author of a work on conjuring." J.B. FINDLAY & THOMAS A. SAWYER,
PROFESSOR HOFFMANN: A STUDY 7 (1977).

Charles J. Carter (1874-1936), who utilized the stage name of Carter the Great,
was one of the most well known stage magicians and illusionists during the 1910s and
1920s. He graduated from law school but went into the magic profession almost
immediately after graduation. See MIKE CAVENEY, CARTER THE GREAT (1995).
There has been a resurgence of interest in Carter the Great with the publication of
Glen David Gold's bestselling novel, CARTER BEATS THE DEVIL (2001).
15 See GuY W.R. HOLLINGWORTH, DRAWING ROOM
DECEPTIONS OR
THE

ETIQUETTE OF DECEPTION

9 (1999).
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When you have excluded the impossible, whatever
remains, however improbable,must be the truth.
- Sir Arthur Conan Doyle"'

II. Too PERFECT THEORY
A. Illustrationof the Too Perfect Theory
Before describing in detail the Too Perfect Theory, it is best to
demonstrate its application by way of example. A well-known magic
trick is the "Cigarette through Quarter.', 17 This trick can be purchased
in any magic shop, and David Blaine and David Copperfield have
performed it on their television specials."' The effect is as follows: a
magician borrows a quarter and a cigarette from a spectator. The
magician puts one end of the cigarette against the center of the
quarter and very slowly and deliberately pushes the cigarette through
the middle of the quarter (in fact, part of the cigarette can be seen
protruding from the rear of the quarter). The magician, if using a
lighted cigarette, may even puff on the cigarette at this stage. After
clearly demonstrating the cigarette has penetrated through the middle
of the quarter, the magician slowly removes the cigarette from the
middle of the quarter with no hole visible in the quarter once the
cigarette is removed, i.e., the hole in the quarter has "healed." The
magician immediately hands the cigarette and quarter to the
spectators for their inspection.
Let me emphasize that the spectators actually see the cigarette
penetrating the middle of the quarter. 9 Now, it should be fairly easy
16

SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet, in THE

COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 315 (n.d.).
17 The "Cigarette through Quarter" trick has
been described in a number of
magic books with various handlings. See, e.g., RICHARD KAUFMAN, THE COLLECTED
ALMANAC 392-95 (1992) (Derek Dingle's version of the Cigarette through Quarter);
JON RACHERBAUMER, IN A CLASS BY HIMSELF: THE LEGACY OF DON ALAN

(2000); 1 WONDER &

MINCH, supra note

8, at 257-60.

27-35

Interestingly, Blaine and Copperfield, who are probably the two most well
known magicians in the country today, routinely violate the Too Perfect Theory. See
JAMY IAN SWISS, SHATTERING ILLUSIONS 184-85 (2002). In fact, noted magician Jamy
Ian Swiss believes that Copperfield has invented a phenomenon that goes beyond the
Too Perfect Theory - what Swiss refers to as the Too Perfect Effect. Id. at 185. For
example, in one of his television specials, Copperfield made the Statue of Liberty
disappear. This is so incredible that almost no spectator would believe this no matter
what method is used. Id.
19 For a picture of a cigarette penetrating a gimmicked quarter,
see
http://www.magictricks.com/coins/cigthru.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
18
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to figure out the trick. Everyone knows that it is impossible to push a
cigarette through the middle of a quarter.20 So if that is exactly what
the magician is doing, then he or she must be using a gimmicked
quarter with a hole in it. In fact, that is the case. The center of the
gimmicked quarter, about the same circumference as a cigarette, is cut
out and separated from the rest of the quarter but is held in place by a
spring hinge on the back of the quarter. One side of the quarter looks
like a regular quarter, and it is this side (and only this side) that the
audience sees. When the cigarette is pressed against the middle of the
gimmicked quarter, the center hinges back, allowing the cigarette to
penetrate the center of the quarter. When the cigarette is removed,
the center of the quarter snaps back into place, leaving no visible hole
in the quarter.
The magician switches the gimmicked quarter for the real quarter
at the beginning of the trick (when the spectators do not know what to
expect) and then switches the quarters back at the end of the trick."
The trick is too perfect, and, as a result, it becomes easy for the
spectators to figure out the method. In fact, a well-known magician,
Jamy Ian Swiss, wrote that after he had performed the Cigarette
through Quarter, perfectly in his opinion, the spectator responded,
"Neat. Where's that nifty coin with the hole in it? '22 Swiss very
quickly realized that he had violated the Too Perfect Theory.21
B. The Origin of the Too Perfect Theory
In 1945, a magician named "Monk" Watson published a small
20

In general, solid through solid effects, such as the Cigarette through Quarter,

are a difficult sell to audiences. See RACHERBAUMER, supra note 17, at 35. Some
performers have tried to help the sell in the Cigarette through Quarter by using a
lighted cigarette and stating that the heat from the lighted cigarette softens the metal
in the center of the quarter so as to allow the cigarette to penetrate the quarter.
Admittedly, this is a stretch. Id.
21 The most difficult part of the trick is switching quarters, particularly at the
end
of the trick when the spectators are closely watching the quarter and the cigarette.
Magicians, however, have developed methods to switch quarters that are
undetectable. See, e.g., HENRY HAY, THE AMATEUR MAGICIAN'S HANDBOOK 143
(1982) (the DeManche change); RICHARD KAUFMAN, COINMAGiC 6-7, 10-12 (1981)
(the Palm change and the Shuttle pass); 1 HARRY LORAYNE, APOCALYPSE 87 (2000)
(Bob Elliott's Flipswitch).
22 See SwISS, supra note 18, at 179.
23 Id. at 180. Another well-known magician, David Ben, who
was formerly a
practicing tax lawyer, has written that the Cigarette through Quarter is "an effect, that
for some strange reason, I have never thought very magical. Perhaps it is 'too
perfect."' DAVID BEN, TRICKS 19 (2003).
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pamphlet on magic entitled The ProfessionalTouch. 4 One chapter in
the pamphlet was entitled, "Can a Trick Be Too Perfect?"25 In this
chapter, Watson described a magic show in which he performed a
trick commonly known as the "Bill in the Lemon. 2 ' Generally, in this
trick, the performer borrows a dollar bill from a spectator. A corner is
torn off the dollar bill and given to the spectator. The performer also
shows a lemon, which is given to a second spectator. The performer
places the dollar bill in an envelope and then lights the envelope on
fire. The second spectator holding the lemon is then given a knife to
cut open the lemon and inside is the rolled-up dollar bill. The missing
corner of the dollar bill in the lemon matches the torn-off corner of
the dollar bill that is being held by the first spectator. The performer
does not come within ten feet of the lemon from the time the second
spectator is given the lemon.
Watson noted that the trick was "too perfect. 2 7 The audience
would quickly realize that there were two dollar bills and that the one
in the lemon was not the same bill that the performer borrowed from
the first spectator. The performer must have previously torn off a
corner of a dollar bill before inserting the bill in the lemon and then
switched this torn corner for the torn corner from the dollar bill
borrowed from the first spectator. Therefore, Watson changed the
performance of the trick by first burning the envelope containing the
borrowed dollar bill and then picking up the lemon, inserting the knife
in the lemon, and giving the lemon to the second spectator.8 The
second spectator would then finish cutting open the lemon to reveal
the dollar bill. Watson noted that performing the trick in this manner
"would give the impression that in some way I [Watson] had put the
bill in the lemon," thus giving him credit for great magical skills. 29
Watson is generally credited with coining the term "Too Perfect," but
his theory did not make much of an impact in the magic world at the

24 MONK WATSON, THE PROFESSIONAL TOUCH
(1945).

25 Id. at 14-15.
The "Bill in the Lemon" has been described in a number of magic
books with
various handlings. See, e.g., DAVID CHARVET, THE BILL IN LEMON BOOK (1990); T.
NELSON DOWNS, THE ART OF MAGIC 315-17 (1909); HAY, supra note 21, at 382; JOHN
NORTHERN HILLIARD, GREATER MAGIC 771-74 (1938); BARRIE RICHARDSON,
THEATER OF THE MIND 34-43 (1999); BILL TARR, 101 EASY TO DO MAGIC TRICKS 32
(1992); MARK WILSON, MARK WILSON'S COMPLETE COURSE IN MAGIC 230-34 (1988).
26

27 WATSON,
28

Id.

29

Id.

supra note 24, at 15.
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time." However, that would change in about twenty-five years.
Dai Vernon is generally considered to be the greatest close-up
magician of the twentieth century.31 Beginning in the 1930s and
continuing until his death, wherever Vernon went quickly became the
center of the magic world. For example, Vernon moved from New
York to California in 1963 to take up residence at the Magic Castle in
Hollywood.3" Many leading magicians from all over the country
traveled to Hollywood to be near him.33 Late in his career, Vernon
was credited with stating that "[a] spectator never or rarely was fooled
by what a magician performed for him in the way of tricks. 3 4 Those
magicians who were not fans and supporters of Vernon claimed that
the great man had finally lost it. Even avid supporters of Vernon
questioned whether he was starting to slip in his mental capacity.
A well-known magician named Rick Johnsson attempted to
analyze Vernon's statement from the perspective that maybe Vernon
was right. In January 1971, Johnsson published his theory in an article
entitled The "Too Perfect" Theory in a magazine designed for closeup magicians.35 Johnsson wrote that it was his belief, and that he also
10See Swiss, supra note 18, at 190 (citing Monk Watson as "likely the man who
truly deserves credit for the catchy terminology").
Terminology similar to "Too Perfect" had been used prior to 1945. For example,
T. Nelson Downs (1867-1938) sent a letter to Faucett Ross in which he wrote, "It is a
mistake to try to do miracles in front of an audience. If a trick is too wonderful it will
not impress the average spectator." LEWIS GANSON, MAGIC WITH FAUCETr Ross 189

(1980) (emphasis added). It is possible that Downs was referring to what Swiss called
the Too Perfect Effect. See supra note 18.
31 The standard biography of Dai Vernon is HE FOOLED HOUDINI: DAI
VERNON, A MAGICAL LIFE (Bruce Cervon & Keith Burns eds., 1992) [hereinafter HE
FOOLED HOUDINI]. However, tax lawyer-turned-magician David Ben is working on a
multivolume biography of Dai Vernon that is expected to be the most comprehensive
work yet on Vernon's life.
A number of books have been written describing in detail the magic of Dai
Vernon. See, e.g., Lewis Ganson, The Dai Vernon Book of Magic (1957); Lewis
Ganson, Dai Vernon's Inner Secrets of Card Magic (1959); Lewis Ganson, Dai
Vernon's More Inner Secrets of Card Magic (1960); Lewis Ganson, Dai Vernon's
Further Inner Secrets of Card Magic (1961); Stars of Magic (Louis Tannen ed., 1961);
Lewis Ganson, Dai Vernon's Ultimate Secrets of Card Magic (1968); Stephen Minch,
Dai Vernon: The Lost Inner Secrets (1987); Stephen Minch, Dai Vernon: More Lost
Inner Secrets (1988); Stephen Minch, Dai Vernon: Further Lost Inner Secrets (1989).
32 See HE FOOLED HOUDINI, supra note 31, at 297.
' Id. at xv. Vernon remained as the magician in residence at the Magic Castle
until his death in 1992 at the age of 98.
34 Johnsson, supra note 7, at 247.
35 Id.
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thought it to be Dai Vernon's belief, that not only do magicians not
fool spectators, but magicians must not fool them." Johnsson wrote
that "[i]t is by not fooling the spectator that we magicians are most
effective. 3 7 To believe this principle, Johnsson claimed that one must
accept two premises: first, a spectator does not attribute supernatural
powers to the magician, and second, the unknown is unacceptable to a
rational spectator.38 Johnsson then broke down the second premise
into the following three hypotheses: (1) spectators will find or invent
an answer for an effect that baffles them; (2) the answer may not be
rational or consistent with the available information; and (3)
spectators are flexible in changing their answer upon receiving more
complete information.3 9
PREMISES
Spectators do not attribute
supernatural powers to the
magician.
The unknown is unacceptable
to a rational spectator.

HYPOTHESES
Spectators will find or invent an
answer for an effect that baffles
them.
The answer may not be rational
or consistent with the available
information.
Spectators are flexible in
changing their answer upon
receiving more complete
information.

Looking to the first premise and the first two hypotheses of the
second premise, Johnsson wrote that magicians should understand
why spectators leave a magical performance by concluding that "it
went up his sleeve" or "it's done with mirrors" or some other
ridiculous explanation that is completely inconsistent with the facts.4
36 Id.
37
38

Id.
Id.

39 Id.
40

Id. at 248. There are times, however, when a trick is accomplished by sleeving
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Because the spectator does not attribute supernatural powers to the
magician (premise one), and the unknown is unacceptable to the
spectator (premise two), the spectator will find or invent an answer
(hypothesis one to premise two), and the answer may not be rational
(hypothesis two to premise two). 41 In certain cases, however, if the
effect is too perfect, the spectator will eliminate all solutions except one,
and that will be the correct one.
Johnsson recommended that magicians utilize hypothesis three to
premise two (spectators are flexible in changing their answers upon
receiving more information) by giving the spectator information that
will (1) lead the spectator away from the correct solution, (2) be
acceptable to the spectator, (3) not detract from the effect, and (4)
give the magician credit for great skill.42 In other words, Johnsson
believed that
[i]t behooves magicians to avoid leaving a spectator one
accurate path to follow, leading to the modus operandi; or to
leave the onlooker paths that take credit away from the
magician himself. It's better to direct the spectator to follow
a path of the magician's own choosing, leading him to the
conclusion that the magician is some clever devil.43
In his article, Johnsson laid out the tenets of The Too Perfect
Theory: some tricks, by virtue of their perfection, become imperfect."
Conversely, some tricks, by virtue of their imperfection, become
perfect.45 In sum, there are two parts to the Too Perfect Theory: the
effect and the method. The more miraculous the effect, the more the
performer needs to focus on the method of accomplishing the effect so
that the spectators are led away from the actual method.
Johnsson gave several examples of tricks in describing his
theory. 46 For example, suppose a spectator is given a deck of cards,
goes into the next room, shuffles the deck, removes one card from the

or through the use of mirrors. See, e.g., Ross BERTRAM, MAGIC AND METHODS OF
Ross BERTRAM 122-28 (1978) (Bertram, an expert at sleeving, devoted a chapter to
that art.); S.H. SHARPE, CONJURORS' OPTICAL SECRETS (1985) (a classic book
detailing the use of mirrors to achieve magical effects).
41 Johnsson, supra note 7, at 248.
42 id.
I at 250.
Id.
Id. at 248.
45 Id.

Id. at 248-50.
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deck, and places that card in her pocket. She returns to the room
where the magician is, and the magician immediately ascertains her
chosen card. Johnsson wrote that the spectator will eventually deduce
that the deck must have been a trick deck (i.e., all the cards are the
same).47 Whether the spectator's solution is the correct one or not
(most likely it is), the spectator will claim credit for herself and the
entertainment value will be lost. To prevent such a result, Johnsson
suggested using the spectator's own deck and then leaving it with her
at the end of the trick.48 However, he immediately dismissed this
solution to the Too Perfect Theory as being too difficult to
accomplish.49
Johnsson then suggested a number of other possibilities for
making the trick less perfect. 5° These include having the spectator
stay in the same room as the magician, making the trick not quite as
impossible; showing an indifferent card(s) in the deck by flashing the
face of the deck at the spectator before the trick begins; handling the
deck a bit before disclosing the chosen card; switching the trick deck
for a regular deck by placing the trick deck in a pocket and then
pulling out a regular deck from the same pocket in anticipation of the
spectator wanting to see the deck; or handling the deck a bit, then
spelling out the name of the chosen card as the magician removes one
card at a time from the top of the deck and finally revealing the
selected card as the top card of the remainder of the deck."
Johnsson noted that for years magicians have been performing
tricks that are too perfect and getting away with it." Johnsson wrote:
But unless they [the tricks] were done at carefully chosen,
psychologically correct times (with an abundant supply of
acting ability thrown in for good measure), they could never
have fooled anyone. More specifically, in order to be most
mystifying, they could only be accomplished after first
Id. at 248. Contrary to what many spectators believe, magicians rarely use
trick decks or trick cards. In fact, some magicians insist on using a borrowed deck or
leaving the deck with the spectators once the performance is completed.
47

9 Id .
50 Id.

so Id.
51 Id. For example, under the last method, if the spectator stated that she
selected the queen of hearts, the magician would spell out q-u-e-e-n-o-f-h-e-a-r-t-s

removing one card from the top of the deck for each letter. The card on top of the
remaining portion of the deck would then be turned over and it would be the queen

of hearts.
52 Id. at 250.
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convincing the spectators by prior miracles; convincing them
that you could do the impossible, then moving on rapidly to
subsequent miracles of a sounder nature, preventing the
spectators from giving the situation much thought. It follows
that such effects, for the most part, could not stand alone or
could not be used for a one-shot bit, an opening or closing
It should be apparent that by applying the
effect.
"imperfecting" technique, otherwise shaky effects requiring a
great deal of skill in placement and performance come close
to being completely flexible and can be performed practically
53
whenever the mood moves one.
C. Solutions to the Too Perfect Problem
Since Johnsson's article in 1971, magicians who accept the Too
Perfect Theory have generally developed three solutions to a trick
that is too perfect.5 4 The first is to make the trick less perfect by
"reducing the claim" or, as Johnsson would say, imperfecting the trick
by weakening the effect. 55 In other words, magicians must reduce the
claim or the effect so that the trick does not look too perfect. For
example, in the Cigarette through Quarter trick, some magicians will
smoke the cigarette while it penetrates the quarter. Reducing the
claim would require the magician not to smoke the cigarette and to
remove the cigarette quickly from the middle of the quarter. 5 ' Then
saw?, 57
the magician may ask the spectator, "What do you think you
The implication is that maybe the cigarette never really penetrated
the quarter, but rather was just part of an illusion. In other words,
magicians can avoid making the trick look too good. However, a
number of magicians have rejected this solution (reducing the claim)
53

Id.

" There is actually a fourth solution that can either stand alone or be used in
conjunction with one of the three other solutions. The fourth solution is to perform a

trick that is too perfect at a well-chosen time - generally, after having performed a
number of other effects, thereby establishing an ability to perform the impossible. Id.

at 250.
" Id. at 247-48.
5 See SwIss, supra note 18, at 181 (explaining that the most important he change

made to Cigarette through Ouarter was to perform other effects first, establishing an
apparent ability to perform the impossible, and then perform the trick; also noting
that he did not puff on the cigarette while inserted through the quarter and did not

leave the cigarette inserted in the quarter for very long).
57 id.
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to the Too Perfect Theory and argued that they would never want to
lessen the impact of a trick."
A second solution to a trick that is too perfect is to raise the
proof.59 In other words, leave the miraculous effect intact but add

facts that support the effect.l Returning again to the Cigarette
through Quarter trick, one way of 'raising the proof is to have a
spectator mark the coin in some unique way to prove that the

cigarette is penetrating the spectator's coin. As a result, the use of a
gimmicked coin is ruled out in the spectator's mind. In other words,
the magician acknowledges that the spectators will figure out the

method and therefore tries to eliminate that method from their
thinking." This second solution is in many ways an ideal solution
See, e.g., Swiss, supra note 18, at 189 ("[T]he argument seems to be that to
lessen the effect is to 'stop thinking too soon."'); 2 WONDER & MINCH, supra note 8,
at 319; Ortiz, supra note 8, at 64-67.
58

"

See generally DARIEL FITZKEE, MAGIC BY MISDIRECTION, 51-60 (1945)

(describing a trick in which a borrowed dollar bill is placed in an envelope, which is
then burned leaving nothing but ashes, and the dollar bill then reappears in a gift
wrapped package that has been in plain view the entire time; stating that the proof
must be raised by, for example, having the spectator select among a number of dollar
bills and the serial number of the selected bill being carefully written down "because
the ultimate effect is so unbelievable that collusion [between the magician and the
spectator] is often suspected").
This solution has also been referred to as canceling or preemptive proof. See
STEPHEN MINCH, SECRETS OF A PUERTO RICAN GAMBLER 11 (1980) ("Each time you

do something in a routine, try to figure out what possible method a spectator might
surmise for its explanation. Then structure the next portion of the routine to knock
over, or cancel, this possibility in the audience's mind.").
6C One of the leading card magicians in the United States, Darwin Ortiz,
believes
that raising the proof is the proper solution to a trick that is too perfect. See Ortiz,
supra note 8, at 64-65. Ortiz, who dropped out of NYU Law School to pursue a
career in magic, writes that in no circumstances would he ever lessen the impact of a
trick (i.e., reduce the claim) but would rather eliminate all possible solutions and
force the spectator to accept the impossibility. Id. at 65.
61 See HENNING NELMS, MAGIC AND SHOWMANSHIP: A HANDBOOK FOR
CONJURORS 115 (1969). Nelms (1900-1986), a lawyer and theatrical director, wrote
that spectators will accept the wildest explanations rather than admit that they were
fooled. Id. For example, "It's all done with mirrors," or "It went up his sleeve," are
two very common explanations given by spectators even when the trick could in no
way be accomplished with mirrors or sleeves. Id. As a result, Nelms suggested
anticipating solutions that spectators may advance and then eliminating those
possibilities from the trick. Id.
Juan Tamariz has devoted an entire book to eliminating all possibilities from a
trick, THE MAGIC WAY (1988). Tamariz established what is known as the Theory of
False Solutions. He does not attempt to lead the spectators to a false and satisfying
solution to an effect but rather leads them to a false solution (away from the actual
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because it leaves the miraculous effect intact. The problem with this
second solution, however, is the difficulty in accomplishing it. It is
extremely difficult to switch a gimmicked coin for a borrowed marked
coin and have the spectators believe that the cigarette is penetrating
the borrowed marked coin. In fact, Johnsson acknowledges this
solution to the Too Perfect Theory (i.e., eliminating all solutions) but
concludes, "I'll leave that to you [to decide].... I'll take the easier
path [of imperfecting the trick]."62
The late Derek Dingle, one of the greatest close-up magicians of
all time, devised a brilliant solution to the Cigarette through Quarter
trick by raising the proof." He had two gimmicked quarters: one
simply had a hole drilled through it (it looked like a bullet had been
shot through it) and the second was the standard gimmicked quarter
for the trick (with the spring hinge). 64 He then performed the trick for
the spectators and asked them if they knew how he did it.6' He then
explained that he switched the borrowed quarter for one with a hole
in it and showed the first gimmicked quarter (with the bullet hole) to
the spectators. 6 He then brought out a second quarter, which the
spectators believed to be the real quarter but in actuality was the
second gimmicked quarter (with the spring hinge), and explained how
he switched the quarter with the bullet hole for this ostensibly real
quarter that he was now holding in his hand.
Dingle then stated, "You know I always thought it would be great
if I could do this without using the quarter with the hole in it. If I
could really do it with a real quarter with no switching or anything like
that, it would make me a real magician." 68 He then slowly pushed the
cigarette through the middle of the second gimmicked quarter.
Dingle would puff on the cigarette while it penetrated the quarter and
would leave the cigarette in the quarter for a short time. 69 When

method) such that, in the end, the false solution will be unacceptable to the spectators
and leave them completely mystified. See Swiss, supra note 18, at 191-92.
62 Johnsson, supranote 7, at 248.
63 See KAUFMAN, supra note 17, at 392-95. Two of the best books on close-up
magic are devoted to the magic of Derek Dingle,
DECEPTIONS (n.d.) and RICHARD KAUFMAN,
DINGLE

(1982).

64 KAUFMAN,

65

Id. at 394.

supra note 17, at 391-92.

66 Id.
67

Id.

68 Id.

69 Id. at 394-95.

HARRY LORAYNE, DINGLE'S

THE COMPLETE WORKS OF DEREK
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Dingle removed the cigarette, no hole was visible in the quarter
because of the spring hinge, and he quickly switched the second
gimmicked quarter for the real quarter before handing it back to the
spectator. °
Dingle's solution attempted to remove from the spectators' minds
the possibility that he switched quarters for the second penetration.
He acknowledged switching quarters the first time he did the
penetration, but the second penetration looked like real magic
because the hinged quarter left behind no hole when he removed the
cigarette.
A third solution
to the Too Perfect Theory is to provide a false
• 72
solution to the trick. In other words, lead the spectators down the
wrong path in determining the solution so that the magician receives
credit for great skill or ingenuity. John Cornelius is one of the most
creative magicians today. 4 He utilizes two quarters for the Cigarette
70 Id. Dingle performs this trick on a video that was released in 1985.
No matter

how hard one looks, it is impossible to see Dingle switching quarters. See Videotape:
Stars of Magic: Derek Dingle (Louis Tannen, Inc. 1985).
71 KAUFMAN, supra note 17, at 394-95. The routine
is effective because of the
psychology involved. Admitting switching coins the first time confirms what the
spectators believe all along, mentally disarming the spectators; switching coins a
second time will not occur to the spectators, and they will be convinced that the
second coin is the real one. Id. at 395.
72 See Johnsson, supra note 7, at 248 (explaining it would be wise
to provide the
spectator with a solution of the magician's choosing so as to lead the spectator away
from the actual method).
73 Watson recognizes this solution and advocates it even though it weakens
the
effect. See WATSON, supra note 24, at 15. Johnsson also recognizes this solution. See
Johnsson, supranote 7, at 248-49. Johnsson believes:
[T]he imperfections, while weakening the effect from a strength standpoint,
actually strengthen the effect from the standpoint that the spectator is led
away from the actual method by being shown and pushed down numerous
blind alleys - all of which should bring him to the conclusion, "I didn't see
that sly, old fox do a darned thing, but he had ample opportunity to do
something sneaky. Gee! What a clever guy!"
Id. at 249. In his conclusion, Johnsson writes:
It behooves magicians to avoid leaving a spectator one accurate path to
follow, leading to the modus operandi; or to leave the onlooker paths that
take credit away from the magician himself. It's better to direct the
spectator to follow a path of the magician's own choosing, leading him to
the conclusion that the magician is "some clever devil."
Id. at 250.
74 For an entire book devoted to the magic of John Cornelius, see LANCE
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through Quarter.75 The first quarter is a regular quarter with a small
hole drilled through the middle. The second quarter is the gimmicked
quarter (with the spring hinge) and also has a small hole drilled
through it. Cornelius shows the gimmicked quarter with the small
hole in it (i.e., he does not borrow a quarter from a spectator). He
pushes the cigarette through the middle of the quarter. He removes
the cigarette from the quarter and then switches quarters, handing the
regular quarter with the small hole drilled in it to the spectators for
their inspection.
The spectators try to determine how Cornelius pushed a cigarette
through a hole clearly smaller than the circumference of the cigarette.
The effect of the trick is probably lessened somewhat, but more
importantly the spectators are led away from the correct method
(switching quarters) to incorrect methods, such as whether the hole
expands in some way, whether the cigarette shrinks, or other
explanations along those lines.76
There are numerous other examples in magic in which the
performer should consider the Too Perfect Theory. For example, a
very common magic trick is the "Floating Dollar Bill. ' '77 The magician
borrows a dollar bill and places it on the table. The dollar bill floats
off the table and then returns to the table. If the magician floats the
dollar bill too high off the table and leaves it floating in the air for too
long a period of time, the spectators will guess that a very fine thread
that cannot be seen is being used, and they will be correct. As a
result,
• 78 a very creative magician named John Kennedy reduces the
claim. He only floats the dollar bill a few inches off the table and for
only a few seconds. 79 Accordingly, the spectators are not sure exactly
what they saw and will either rule out or pass over the possibility of a
very fine thread being used. 8°
A final example is the "Torn and Restored Card" trick.8 ' The

PIERCE, THE AWARD WINNING MAGIC OF JOHN CORNELIUS (2001).

" See STEPHEN MINCH, CARNEYCOPIA

xxviii (1991).

76 Id.

77 The "Floating Dollar Bill" has been described in a number
of magic books

and pamphlets under various names. See, e.g., NICHOLAS EINHORN, THE PRACTICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAGIC 219 (2002); JON LECLAIR, THE ART OF INVISIBLE THREAD
65-74 (1997); MINCH, supra note 75, at xxviii-xxix; GENO MUNARI & MARK BLAIS,
ULTRA FLOATING OBJECT 14-15 (1997); Swiss, supra note 18, at 166-67.
78 See MINCH, supra note 75, at xxviii.
79 Id.

soId. at xxxix.
"' The "Torn and Restored Card" has been described in a number of magic
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magician has a spectator select a playing card from a deck of cards and
then proceeds to tear the selected card into four pieces. The magician
then restores the playing card, piece by piece. Putting aside the
illogical aspect of the trick (why tear the playing card to begin with if
the magician wants a restored playing card at the end?), most
spectators will guess correctly that there are two playing cards - one
of the two cards is torn into four pieces and these pieces are then
switched for the duplicate card.
Magician-turned-barrister Guy
Hollingworth solves the problem by raising the proof.82 When the
spectator selects the playing card, he has the spectator sign across the
face of the card.83 He then restores the playing card, piece by piece,
with the signature in full view the entire time. It is an incredibly
difficult trick to do well, but properly performed, the spectators will
either rule out or not suspect the possibility of a duplicate card.
In sum, there are certain magic tricks that are simply too perfect
when performed. As a result, the trick may not fool the audience, and
even worse, the effect itself may lead the audience to discover how the
trick is performed. Magicians have developed three solutions to a
trick that is too perfect: (1) reduce the claim, thereby making the trick
less miraculous; (2) raise the proof by adding in convincers to support
or justify the miraculous effect; or (3) lead the spectators down a false
path so as to give the magician credit for great skill or ingenuity (or
eliminate all possible solutions to the trick, thereby completely fooling
the spectators).

books and pamphlets with various handlings. See, e.g., JOHN CARNEY, TORN AND
RESTORED (1995); HOLLINGWORTH, supra note 15, at 275-311; KAUFMAN, supra note
63, at 187-89; HARRY LORAYNE, STAR QUALITY: THE MAGIC OF DAVID REGAL 15359 (1987); JOHN LoviCK, THE REPARATION (2d ed. 1998); J.C. WAGNER, 7 SECRETS 1-

27 (1978).
82 See HOLLINGWORTH, supra note 15, at 275-311. Hollingworth's version
of the
Torn and Restored Card is generally considered to be the best. He performed his
version on television in 1996, and it immediately created a huge sensation in the magic
world. Hollingworth's version is extremely difficult to perform well, which probably
explains why very few magicians utilize it in their performances.
83 Id. at 278-80.
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Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall
be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.
4
- Judge Learned Hand
III. APPLICATION OF THE TOO PERFECT THEORY IN TAX LAW
Tax law is an extremely demanding area of law. One small
mistake in structuring
a transaction can lead to disastrous tax
85
consequences.
As a result, tax practitioners strive to structure a
transaction as perfectly as possible."'
But it is possible for a
transaction to be structured so as to reach a tax result that is too
perfect. If the transaction is too perfect, the government and the
courts may determine that the sole purpose of the transaction was tax
avoidance and, as a result, may recharacterize the transaction to
produce different tax results or may simply deny the taxpayer the
desired tax consequences.
One of the most well-known and important U.S. Supreme Court
tax cases is Gregory v. Helvering.87 In this case, Evelyn Gregory
84

Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aftd, 293 U.S. 465

(1935). There has been a resurgence of interest in the Gregory case due, in large part,
to the publicity surrounding corporate tax shelters. See, e.g., Symposium, Business
Purpose, Economic Substance, and Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 3 (2001);
Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters (pts. I & II) 55 TAX L. REV. 125, 289 (2002).
85 Professor James Eustice once stated in an ABA Tax
Section interview:
It's very tough to practice. That's one of the joys of academia - you can
raise questions that you don't have to answer. When you are on the line
you have to give an answer. I would guess it's not only not fun to practice
[tax law], I would guess it's scary. What little I've done of it, I know it is.
Because you're not sure what little thing is tucked down there some place.
Interview with James S. Eustice, Gerald L. Wallace Professor of Law, NYU School of
Law, in 1992 A.B.A. SEC. TAXATION, at 38,42.
In fact, leading academics and practitioners have written numerous form
books designed to help tax practitioners avoid making any mistakes in structuring
transactions. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITIKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS: FORMS (4th ed. 1995); MARTIN D. GINSBURG &
JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND BUYOUTS (June 2004); ROBERT L.
WHITMIRE

ET

AL.,

FEDERAL

TAXATION

OF

PARTNERSHIPS

AND

PARTNERS:

(2d ed. Supp. 2002).
87 293 U.S. 465 (1935). One leading academic has described the Gregory case as
"[p]erhaps the most famous tax case in history...." See George K. Yin, The Story of
Crane: How a Widow's Misfortune Led to Tax Shelters, in TAX STORIES 207, 228 n.49

STRUCTURING AND DRAFTING AGREEMENTS

(Paul L. Caron ed., 2003).
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owned all of the stock of United Mortgage Corporation (UMC).
UMC in turn owned 1000 shares of Monitor Securities Corporation
(Monitor). Gregory wanted to dispose of the Monitor stock and at
the same time minimize the amount of taxes she would owe.
Consequently, she formed Averill Corporation on September 18,
1928. Three days later, UMC transferred its Monitor stock to Averill
Corporation for which all of the shares of Averill were issued to
Gregory.
On September 24, 1928, Gregory liquidated Averill
Corporation and received the 1000 shares of Monitor stock. Averill
Corporation did not conduct any business, nor was it intended to
conduct any business (apart from holding the Monitor stock for three
days). Gregory immediately sold the Monitor stock for $133,333.33,
reporting a capital gain of $76,007.88. 88
Gregory maintained that the transfer of Monitor stock from UMC
to Averill was a reorganization followed by a liquidation of Averill.8 9
8 According to the Board of Tax Appeals, the liquidation of Averill, whereby
Gregory received the Monitor shares, resulted in gain of $76,007.88, the difference
betwcen the undisputed basis of $57,325.45 attributed to the Averill shares and
$133,333.33, the undisputed value of the Monitor shares so received. The immediate
sale by Gregory of the Monitor shares for no more than their value resulted in the
realization by her of no further gain. See Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 223,
226 (1932), rev'd sub nom. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293
U.S. 465 (1935).
R9Gregory argued that the transaction fell within the definition of
reorganization of section 112(i)(1)(B) of the Revenue Act of 1928. That provision
provided that "(1) The term 'reorganization' means.. . (B) a transfer by a corporation
of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the
transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the
assets are transferred ... " See I.R.C. § 112(i)(1)(B); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
at 468. This provision is very similar to section 368(a)(1)(D) of present law.
Because the transaction was a reorganization, Gregory argued that she came
within section 112(g) of the Revenue Act of 1928. That provision provided:
If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a
shareholder in a corporation a party to the reorganization, stock or
securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the
reorganization, without the surrender by such shareholder of stock or
securities in such a corporation, no gain to the distributee from the receipt
of such stock or securities shall be recognized....
I.R.C. § 112(g); 293 U.S. at 468. No provision under present law is exactly the same as
section 112(g), but section 355 does permit some tax-free spin-offs. See BERNARD
WOLFMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 543 (3d ed.

1990). A spin-off is a pro rata distribution by a parent corporation of the stock of a
subsidiary corporation. See 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS $ 11.01[1][e] (7th ed.
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The Internal Revenue Service (Service) argued that the
reorganization had no substance and therefore should be disregarded.
The Board of Tax Appeals upheld Gregory's view and rejected the
view of the Service.9 ° The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
a famous opinion written by Judge Learned Hand, reversed the Board
of Tax Appeals and held that no reorganization had taken place. 9' As
a result, Ms. Gregory realized dividend income on the distribution of
the Averill stock. 92
Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court,
affirming the decision of the Second Circuit.93 He wrote that "[t]he
legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law

2000).
" Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. at 225 (1932).
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).

91

In the Second Circuit

opinion, Judge Hand wrote:
We agree with the Board [of Tax Appeals] and the taxpayer that a
transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to
evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be
as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best
pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.
Id, at 810. In holding against the taxpayer, Judge Hand continued:
Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a
transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary definitions of
each term used in the statutory definition. It is quite true, as the Board [of
Tax Appeals] has very well said, that as the articulation of a statute
increases, the room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a
sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more
than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to
the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create.
Id. at 810-11.
9' The Commissioner, according to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, argued
that "the whole transaction was merely the declaration of a dividend by the United
Mortgage Corporation consisting of the Monitor shares in specie .... " 69 F.2d at 810.
Justice Sutherland, writing for the Supreme Court, thought, however, that the
Commissioner claimed the transaction should be taxed "as though the United
corporation had paid [Ms. Gregory] a dividend consisting of the amount realized from
the sale of the Monitor shares." 293 U.S. at 467. Judge Hand, writing for the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote that "the result is the same whether the tax be
calculated as the Commissioner calculated it, or upon the value of the Averill shares
as a dividend...." 69 F.2d at 811. See also WOLFMAN, supra note 89, at 548.
93 See Gregory v. Helvering,293 U.S. 465 (1935), aff'g 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
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permits, cannot be doubted."94 He then wrote that "the question for
determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive,
was the thing which the statute intended." 95
Justice Sutherland concluded that the transaction entered into by
Gregory was
[s]imply an operation having no business or corporate
purpose - a mere device which put on the form of a
corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real
character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which
was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to
reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer
a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner. No doubt, a
new and valid corporation was created. But that corporation
was nothing more than a contrivance to the end last
described.9
In the final part of the opinion, Justice Sutherland wrote, "In these
circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are susceptible of but
one interpretation.
"9

The transaction "was in fact an elaborate and

devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization, and nothing else." 98 The transaction was outside the
plain intent of the reorganization statute and "[t]o hold otherwise
would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory
provision ... of all serious purpose. ' 99

What is fascinating about Justice Sutherland's opinion is that he
applied the Too Perfect Theory to a transaction involving tax law.
The Too Perfect Theory generally provides that a trick that is too
perfect will fool no one and, in fact, will actually allow the spectators
to determine how the trick is accomplished because only one solution
is possible. Justice Sutherland wrote that the transaction Gregory
entered into was "an elaborate and devious form of conveyance
1 °°
masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else."
This was easy to see because Gregory formed Averill on September
18, had UMC transfer the Monitor stock to Averill on September 21,

'4

293 U.S. at 469.

95 Id.
96

Id.

97 Id. at
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.

470 (emphasis added).
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and then liquidated Averill on September 24. Justice Sutherland
noted that there is only "one interpretation" of the transaction - it
was done simply to reduce taxes with no business or corporate
purpose.' In other words, Gregory's transaction was too perfect, and
it thereby became easy for Justice Sutherland to figure out that the
sole motive for the transaction was tax avoidance. Justice Sutherland
a transaction done solely
then recharacterized the transaction 1°because
2
for tax avoidance was unacceptable.
Let us examine another well-known tax case, Kronenberg v.
Commissioner.0 3 Kronenberg, a U.S. citizen, maintained his legal
residence in Lucerne, Switzerland. He was born in Switzerland in
1922 and immigrated to the United States in 1949. He became a
naturalized U.S. citizen in 1955 but also retained his Swiss citizenship.
Kronenberg was the president of a mica importing business, Polymica
& Insulation Co., Inc. (PIC) and also owned slightly over 95% of the
stock of PIC. In 1966, Kronenberg decided to sell the business, and
on January 26, 1966, he entered into an executory contract to sell
substantially all of its assets. He also intended to return to
Switzerland after April 30, 1967, in accordance with an employment
agreement he had with the purchaser of those assets.
On February 26, 1966, the PIC shareholders voted to adopt a plan
of complete liquidation, which was to be completed by February 25,
1967.104 A timely election to liquidate PIC was filed with the Service.
Id.
As a result, it is possible to view Justice Sutherland's opinion as employing a
three-step process. Under the first step, he determined that the transaction in
Gregory was, in essence, too perfect. 293 U.S. at 469-70. Under the second step, as a
result of the transaction being too perfect, Justice Sutherland concluded that there
was "but one interpretation" of its goal - tax avoidance. Id. at 470. These two steps
are the two aspects of the Too Perfect Theory - result and method. See supra notes
44-46 and accompanying text. Under step three, Justice Sutherland recharacterized
the transaction because of the absence of a "business or corporate purpose," i.e., the
transaction was done simply for tax avoidance. Id. at 469-70.
Three recent court decisions have called into question the application and
viability of the business purpose doctrine or economic substance doctrine. See, e.g.,
Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2004) (holding
for the taxpayer in a contingent liability tax shelter transaction); TIFD III-E Inc. v.
United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding for the taxpayer in a lease
stripping transaction); Coltec Indus. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004) (holding
forthe taxpayer in a contingent liability tax shelter transaction). But see Long Term
Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding for
the government in a lease stripping transaction that lacked economic substance).
103 64 T.C. 428 (1975).
'04 Under section 337, as in effect from 1954 to 1986, if a corporation adopted a
101

102
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In December 1966, Kronenberg's accountants told him that if he
received his liquidating distributions from PIC after he lost U.S.
citizenship, he would not be subject to U.S. tax on those distributions.
In January 1967, Kronenberg decided definitively to move to
Switzerland and participated in a flurry of activities in preparation for
departure. He sold the family home, purchased airline tickets, made
arrangements for transporting the family possessions, and engaged
attorneys to prepare papers to formally liquidate PIC.
On February 20, 1967, the PIC shareholders adopted a certificate
of dissolution. The next day, Kronenberg and his family left the
United States, arriving in Switzerland on February 22, 1967.
Kronenberg renounced his U.S. citizenship on February 23. On
February 24, the PIC assets were transferred to Kronenberg's
personal account (pursuant to his instructions to his attorneys to
arrange for the transfer of the PIC assets at the latest possible time).
Kronenberg did not report the distributions in liquidation of PIC in
his U.S. income tax returns. The Service argued that section 877
applied, requiring Kronenberg to include the PIC liquidating
distributions in income and pay U.S. taxes on that amount.
The Tax Court agreed with the Service that section 877 applied,
and, as a result, Kronenberg was required to pay U.S. taxes on the
PIC liquidating distributions. 1°5 The court recognized that section 877
applies to a former U.S. citizen if that individual renounced U.S.
citizenship within the last ten years, unless such loss of citizenship did6
not have as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of taxes.1
plan of complete liquidation and distributed all of its assets in complete liquidation
within the twelve-month period beginning on the date of adoption of the plan of
liquidation, it did not recognize gain or loss from the sale or exchange of property
within the twelve-month period. See BORIS 1.BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
11.61 (5th ed. 1987).
Congress repealed section 337 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and replaced it
with a completely different type of provision applicable to the liquidation of a
subsidiary into its parent. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2269-75
(1986).
105 64 T.C. at 432-37.
106 Id. at 434. Congress enacted section 877 in 1966 and substantially amended it
in 1996. See Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 and Presidential Election Campaign
Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 103(f)(1), 80 Stat. 1539, 1551-55; Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 511, 110
Stat. 1936, 2093-100. The purpose of the section is to impose an alternative taxing
regime for ten years on former U.S. citizens (and certain former U.S. residents) who
renounced U.S. citizenship, unless the loss of U.S. citizenship did not have for one of
its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income, estate, gift, or generation
skipping transfer taxes. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH
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The court concluded that at least one of the principal purposes for
expatriation was to secure the tax advantages of which Kronenberg
learned from his accountants in December 1966, and therefore section
877 applied to Kronenberg.'0 7 In support of its conclusion, the court
wrote, "The timing of Mr. Kronenberg's activities in January and
February 1967 is too perfect to be unplanned."' 8
The Tax Court, then, not only applied the Too Perfect Theory but
actually used the words "too perfect" in its opinion. Again, the Too
Perfect Theory has two parts: the result and the method to reach that
result. Kronenberg argued for the best possible result for him: no
U.S. taxes on the PIC liquidating distributions. The court then looked
at the method to reach that perfect result and concluded that the
method was "too perfect."1 °9 In other words, the filing of the PIC
dissolution certificate on February 20 and Kronenberg's activities

CONG., REVIEW OF THE PRESENT LAW TAX AND IMMIGRATION TREATMENTr OF
RELINQUISHMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND TERMINATION OF LONG-TERM RESIDENCY

(Joint Comm. Print 2003); 3 BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 66.1 (2d ed. 2001); Michael S. Kirsch,
Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm
Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863 (2004).
Congress has again substantially amended section 877 as part of the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, adopting objective rules to replace the subjective
determination of tax avoidance. See Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 804, 118 Stat. 1418, 156973.
107 64 T.C. at 435.
108

Id. (emphasis added).
The Kronenberg case should be contrasted with Furstenberg v.

1'09 Id.

Commissioner, 83 T.C. 755 (1984). In Furstenberg, the taxpayer, a U.S. citizen who
renounced her U.S. citizenship to become an Austrian citizen, was not subject to
section 877. After discussing the Kronenbergcase, the Tax Court concluded that the
taxpayer's activities in Furstenbergwere "too imperfect from a tax standpoint to have
been planned." 83 T.C. at 780. The Tax Court came to this conclusion upon noting
that the taxpayer did not engage in activities connected to expatriation, decided to
expatriate before knowing the tax consequences, lived in Europe for more than seven
years, knew only of negative tax consequences at the time of expatriation, and did no
planning with respect to trust distributions until after her expatriation. Id.
There are numerous classic (and not so classic) examples in the tax laws in which
a transaction has been respected while a similar but too perfect transaction has been
recharacterized. Compare Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945)
(recharacterizing liquidating distribution followed by sale) with United States v.
Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950) (respecting liquidating distribution
followed by sale) and compare Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d

1185 (5th Cir. 1970) (recharacterizing distribution from subsidiary followed by sale of
the subsidiary) with Litton Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1086 (1987)
(respecting distribution from subsidiary followed by sale of the subsidiary).
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thereafter - leaving the United States on February 21, arriving in
Switzerland on February 22, renouncing U.S. citizenship on February
23, and finally receiving the funds from PIC on February 24 - were
too perfectly planned, reaching a too perfect result, thereby easily
allowing the Tax Court to conclude that this transaction was done for
tax avoidance purposes under section 877.
It [watching a skillful lawyer] was like close-up magic.
You know - how it doesn't really matter whether the
balls are disappearing, because it truly is magic that
human skill can make it look that way.
- Scott Turow, lawyer and author11 °
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE Too PERFECT THEORY

The courts have utilized the Too Perfect Theory in
recharacterizing a transaction for tax purposes for many years, going
back at least as far as the leading case of Gregory in 1935.111 Even
though Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court in Gregory, did not
use the term Too Perfect, he applied the theory to Gregory's
transaction in recharacterizing it. 112 There is, however, one significant
difference between what a conjuror does and what a tax lawyer does
in applying the Too Perfect Theory. The conjuror tells his audience
that he is going to fool them with sleight of hand."' As a result, the
audience is prepared to be fooled and some, if not most, of the
members of the audience may afterwards attempt to figure out how
the tricks were done .1144 The audience knows there is no such thing as
actual or real magic and realizes it is about to be deceived with sleight
of hand or maybe mechanical trickery (such as sawing a woman in
half). 1 5 Some magicians will attempt to eliminate all possible methods
that a spectator may consider in trying to determine how a trick is

110SCOTTTUROW,

THE BURDEN OF PROOF 327 (1990).
II See supra notes 87-102 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
113 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

See Swiss, supra note 18, at 186-87.
The Too Perfect Theory has been most often applied to close-up magic.
However, the theory can also be applied to stage magic and large-scale illusions, such
as sawing a woman in half. See Richard Kaufman, Genii Speaks, GENII: THE
CONJURORS' MAG., Aug. 2001, at 10-11 ("The discussion [of the Too Perfect Theory]
is generally limited to close-up magic (though it shouldn't be) ... ").
114
115
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done.' 6 As a result, however, one prominent magician has noted that
the magician is hoisting the spectator on the horns of a dilemma:
"There is no such thing as magic/There is no other possible
explanation.

,117

There is one category of conjuror that attempts to convince his
audience that what he is doing is actual magic and not sleight of hand:
For example, during the early
the so-called psychics or mystics.
1900s, a number of psychics represented themselves as performing
real magic, and, as a result, Harry Houdini spent the latter part of his
life exposing psychics as performing nothing more than trickery or
sleight of hand." 9 More recently, Uri Geller became famous during
the 1970s for bending keys and spoons with just the power of thought,
fixing broken watches by merely holding the watches in his hands for
Geller
a few moments, and reading the thoughts of others.
represented himself as performing real magic, not sleight of hand, and
many people believed that he was the real thing."" In other words, the
tricks that he was performing were not magicians' tricks but rather
reflected real magic, i.e., he could really bend spoons and fix broken
watches with just his magical powers. Magicians, however, were not
so easily fooled.12 In the mid-1970s, a well-known magician named
James Randi (also known as the Amazing Randi) demonstrated that
See supra notes 60-62.
117 WHIT HAYDN, NOTES ON THREE CARD MONTE

112 (2001).

118Johnsson, who popularized the Too Perfect Theory, wrote that the need to

consider the Too Perfect Theory is lessened for psychics or mystics because most
people believe in, or would like to believe in, the possibility of extrasensory
perception. See Johnsson, supra note 7, at 250. See also JOHN BANNON, SMOKE AND
MIRRORS 11 (1991) ("Some forms of deception - those used by con men, politicians,
card sharps, and some mentalists - are not meant to be revealed. The means of
deception, and even the fact of deception, are kept secret. In a magic trick, the fact of
deception is presumed - one cannot really do the impossible.").
For a recent discussion by a conjuror of psychics and mystics, see MARTIN
GARDNER, ARE UNIVERSES THICKER THAN BLACKBERRIES? 225-72 (2003).
119 Houdini published a book, two years before his death, exposing
spiritualists,
mediums, and psychics. See HARRY HOUDINI, A MAGICIAN AMONG THE SPIRITS
(1924). See also J.C. CANNELL, THE SECRETS OF HOUDINI (1973); HOUDINI ON
MAGIC (Walter B. Gibson & Morris N. Young eds., 1953).
120 See generally GARDNER, supra note 118, at 203-04, 244-45.
121 Martin Gardner, who wrote the Mathematical Games column for Scientific
American for over twenty-five years, has written that "[b]ecause magicians are the
world's experts on the art of deception, it is one of the scandals of psychic research
that investigators, except on rare occasions, will not seek the aid of knowledgeable
conjurors when they test psychics who perform feats unexplainable by natural laws."
See GARDNER, supra note 118, at 244.
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all of Geller's routines could be accomplished by sleight of hand.
Randi even published several books in which he explained the
workings behind many of Geller's routines.12 1
Geller soon
disappeared from the public eye with only occasional appearances in

more recent times.
The tax lawyer, however, is bound by ethical obligations in
performing her duties."' For example, she cannot deceive or try to
deceive the government or the courts (as by creating evidence that is
124
false or misleading).
Consequently, the government and the courts

are generally not on alert for intentional deception, but rather simply
analyze the transaction in question and apply the tax laws to that
particular transaction in reaching a result.
If a tax lawyer structures a transaction in such a way as to achieve
a result that is too perfect, the government and the courts may
become wary and attempt to recharacterize the transaction. The tax

lawyer in such cases may be viewed as a conjuror by the government
and the courts who is trying to deceive them with a transaction that is
See JAMES RANDI, THE MAGIC OF URI GELLER (1975); JAMES RANDI,
THE
TRUTH ABOUT URI GELLER (1982).
Randi's foundation, the James Randi Educational Foundation, offers a $1
million prize to "anyone who can show, under proper observing conditions, evidence
of any paranormal, supernatural, or occult power or event." See James Randi
Educational
Foundation, One Million Dollar Paranormal Challenge, at
http://www.randi.org/research/index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). To date, no one
has passed even the preliminary tests necessary to qualify for the prize.
123 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK,
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 833-48 (Revised 4th ed. 2002); BERNARD
WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (1995); BERNARD
WOLFMAN FT AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE (5th ed. 1999).
124 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 10.51 (2004) ("Incompetence
and disreputable
conduct" includes "giving false or misleading information, or participating in any way
in the giving of false or misleading information to the Department of the Treasury or
any officer or employee thereof, or to any tribunal authorized to pass upon Federal
tax matters, in connection with any matter pending or likely to be pending before
them, knowing such information to be false or misleading."); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2003) ("In the course of representing a client a lawyer
shall not knowingly: make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person."); id. R. 3.3(a) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly: make a false statement of
material fact or law to a tribunal.., or offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false."); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965)
(stating that "the lawyer is under a duty not to mislead the Service, either by
misstatement, silence, or through his client"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (stating that "the lawyer is under a duty not
to mislead the Internal Revenue Service deliberately, either by misstatements or by
silence or by permitting the client to mislead").
122
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too perfect."' As a result, tax lawyers, like conjurors, have devised
several methods to attempt to prevent a court from recharacterizing a
transaction that is too perfect, namely, reducing the claim, raising the

proof, or providing a false (or alternative) theory.
Confusing details, if not ov.erdone, help to obscure trails
leading to [the] solution.
126
- DarielFitzkee
V. STRUCTURING TRANSACTIONS To AVOID THE APPLICATION OF
THE Too PERFECT THEORY

As is discussed above, in the field of conjuring, there are generally
three methods for avoiding the application of the Too Perfect Theory:
reducing the claim, raising the proof, and providing a false (or
alternative) solution."' These three solutions are as applicable in
structuring transactions as they are in magic. Each of these three
solutions has been utilized by tax lawyers to prevent a court from
recharacterizing a transaction. 128

125

If the tax lawyer convinces the government and the courts that what she is

doing is legitimate and no deception is involved, then she may be analogized to the
psychics or mystics. As a result, if the government or courts attempt to expose her as
deceiving or misleading them, then they may be acting in the role of a James Randi
exposing a Uri Geller. However, tax lawyers in general may be viewed by the
government and the courts as conjurors performing the trick of tax savings or tax
avoidance.
126 FITZKEE, supra note 59, at 58. Fitzkee was an acoustical engineer who spent a
large part of his life involved in theater. He wrote three of the finest books ever
written on the presentation of magic: SHOWMANSHIP FOR MAGICIANS (1943), THE

(1944), and MAGIC BY MISDIRECTION (1945).
"' See supra notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 54 for a fourth possible solution. The fourth possible solution
does not seem relevant in the context of a tax lawyer structuring transactions. It may
be possible, however, in that a tax lawyer may structure a number of transactions that
are not recharacterized by the government or the courts. Once the government has
become accustomed to the tax lawyer structuring transactions in a manner that may
be slightly aggressive, then the tax lawyer may attempt to structure a transaction that
reaches a result that is too perfect and which, in isolation, would be recharacterized
by the government. But the tax lawyer who has convinced the government of the
legitimacy of the earlier transactions may be able to get away with a transaction that is
too perfect.
TRICK BRAIN
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Reducing the Claim

Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner1 9 is probably the leading
tax case involving treaty shopping. In this case, Ecuadorian Corp.,
Ltd. (ECL), a Bahamian corporation, owned 99.997% of the stock of
Aiken Industries, Inc., a Delaware corporation. Aiken Industries
owned all of the outstanding stock of Mechanical Products, Inc.
(MPI), also a Delaware corporation. ECL also owned all of the
outstanding stock of Compania de Cervezas Nacionales (CCN), an
Ecuadorian corporation.
On April 1, 1963, MPI borrowed $2.25 million from ECL. In
return, MPI issued to ECL a twenty-year 4% sinking fund promissory
note. The following year, ECL assigned the note to Industrias
Hondurenas S.A. de C.V. (Industrias), a newly formed, wholly owned
subsidiary of CCN. Industrias was incorporated under the laws of the
Republic of Honduras. As consideration for the assignment, ECL
received nine promissory notes of Industrias payable on demand, each
in the principal amount of $250,000, and each bearing interest at the
rate of 4% per annum.
During the years in question, the United States had an income tax
treaty with the Republic of Honduras (the treaty terminated on
December 31, 1966). The treaty provided for a zero withholding tax
on interest received by a resident of a treaty country from sources
within the other treaty country. As a result, MPI (a U.S. corporation)
did not withhold any tax when it made interest payments on the 4%
sinking fund promissory note held by Industrias (a Republic of
Honduras corporation). If MPI had made the interest payments to
ECL (a Bahamian corporation), then it would have been subject to a
30% withholding tax because the United States did not have an
130
income tax treaty with the Bahamas.
The Tax Court noted that ECL transferred the 4% $2.25 million
129 56 T.C.

925 (1971), acq., 1972-2 C.B. 1.
general, the United States imposes a 30% tax on U.S. source interest
payments. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a). The tax is generally collected by a withholding
requirement imposed on the payer. I.R.C. §§ 1441, 1442. There are two important
statutory exceptions to the imposition of the 30% withholding tax on U.S. source
interest income: the bank deposit interest and the portfolio interest provisions. I.R.C.
§§ 871(h), 871(i)(2)(A), 881(c), 881(d). Neither of the two statutory exceptions was
applicable in Aiken Industries because the U.S. source interest was not interest on a
bank deposit and the portfolio interest rules were not enacted until 1984. See Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 648. As a result,
the taxpayer in Aiken Industries had to rely on an income tax treaty to reduce the
30% withholding tax on U.S. source interest income.
130 In
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sinking fund promissory note of MPI to Industrias in exchange for
nine promissory notes of Industrias with the same total principal
amount of $2.25 million and with the same 4% interest rate. 3 More
specifically, Industrias received exactly what it gave up in a dollar-fordollar exchange. As a result, Industrias paid out exactly what it
collected and therefore made no profit on the exchange of notes.132
Because Industrias had the same inflow and outflow of funds and
MPI, ECL, and Industrias were all members of the same corporate
group, the Tax Court concluded that the transaction did not have a
'3
valid economic or business purpose. The transaction's only purpose
1
3
was tax avoidance. ' As a result, the court found that the interest
payments were not exempt from taxation under the treaty.
13
Aiken Industries is a classic case in the area of international tax.
Because the tax results were so perfect, it was easy for a court to
determine that the sole purpose of the transaction was tax avoidance
and that there was no economic or business purpose for the
transaction.
A number of years later, the Tax Court had another opportunity
to decide a case involving treaty shopping, Northern Indiana Public
Service Co. v. Commissioner.36 In this case, Northern Indiana Public
Service Co. (NIPSCO), a U.S. corporation, had a wholly owned
foreign subsidiary, Northern Indiana Public Service Finance N.V.
(Finance). In early 1981, NIPSCO formed Finance in Curacao under
the Commercial Code of the Netherlands Antilles. Finance was to
issue bonds in the Eurobond market and then loan the proceeds to
NIPSCO so that it could use the funds to construct additions to its
utility properties.
In October 1981, Finance issued seven-year notes in the
Eurobond market in the amount of $70 million at an interest rate of
17.25%. Finance then immediately loaned the proceeds to NIPSCO
in exchange for a seven-year note in the amount of $70 million at an
131

56 T.C. at 934.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134 Id. The Tax Court noted that a tax avoidance motive is not inherently fatal to

a transaction; however, a tax avoidance motive standing by itself is not a business
purpose sufficient to support the transaction. Id.
135Aiken Industries is generally considered to be the classic example of a
taxpayer involved in treaty shopping. See, e.g., BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 106,
67.3.2; JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 31, 237-40 (2000); CHARLES
KINGSON, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 62-85 (1998).
136 105 T.C. 341 (1995), af'd, 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1997).
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interest rate of 18.25%. As a result, Finance earned income on the
one percentage point spread of approximately $700,000 each year (1%
times $70 million) for four years until October 1985, when NIPSCO
paid off the $70 million note to Finance and Finance then redeemed
the $70 million notes it had issued in the Eurobond market. As a
result, Finance's aggregate income over the four years on the spread
between the Eurobond notes and NIPSCO's note was $2.8 million.
Finance also earned interest income on its investments (exclusive of
interest received from NIPSCO).
During the years in question, the237United States had an income tax
treaty with the Netherlands Antilles. The treaty provided for a zero
withholding tax on interest received by a resident of a treaty country
from sources within the other treaty country. As a result, NIPSCO (a
U.S. corporation) did not withhold any tax when it made interest
payments on the $70 million note to Finance (a Netherlands Antilles
corporation). In addition, Finance did not withhold any tax when it
made interest payments on the $70 million Eurobond notes. The
government argued that Finance was a mere conduit or agent and that
it should be ignored. 138 According to the government, NIPSCO
should be viewed as having paid interest directly to the Eurobond
holders and should have withheld taxes on the interest payments. 139
The Tax Court stated that "a choice to transact business in
corporate form will be recognized for tax purposes so long as there is
a business purpose or the corporation engages in business activity. ,140
The Tax Court noted that Finance engaged in the business activity of
lending and borrowing money at a profit and that activity was
sufficient to recognize its existence t4' The Tax Court distinguished

137In a note dated June 29, 1987, the U.S. government notified the Netherlands
Antilles (and Aruba) that it was terminating its income tax treaty with the

Netherlands Antilles (and Aruba) effective January 1, 1988. On July 10, 1987, the
U.S. government modified its June 29 note to provide that Article VIII of both
treaties would continue in force after December 31, 1987. Article VIII exempts from

U.S. tax interest payments from U.S. persons to corporations and residents of the
Netherlands Antilles (and Aruba). A protocol between the United States and the

Netherlands Antilles became effective on December 30, 1996, limiting the U.S. tax
exemption for interest payments. See John Venuti et al., Current Status of U.S. Tax
Treaties and International Tax Agreements, 33 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 260, 261 n.3
(2004).
138 105 T.C. at 347.
139 Id.
140
141

Id.
Id. at 348.
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Northern Indiana from Aiken Industries.

142

In Aiken Industries, the

transaction was entirely between related parties.14 1 In contrast,
Finance borrowed funds from unrelated third parties, the Eurobond
holders.144 In addition, and probably more importantly, Finance's
borrowing and lending activity was a business activity that resulted in
$2.8 million of income for Finance over a four-year period.'
In
Aiken Industries, Industrias paid out exactly what it collected and
therefore made no profit on the transaction.
The taxpayer in Aiken Industries lost while the taxpayer in
Northern Indiana won. The primary difference is that in the former
case, the transaction was structured so as to reach a result that was too
perfect. 146
More specifically, MPI made interest payments to
Industrias, which in turn made identicalinterest payments to ECL. It
was easy for the Tax Court to, in essence, ignore the existence of
Industrias and treat the interest payments as made directly from MPI
to ECL. In Northern Indiana, however, NIPSCO made interest
payments to Finance, which in turn made non-identical interest
payments to the Eurobond holders. As a result, approximately
$700,000 of income was built into the transaction each year for
Finance. Finance would then owe taxes each year to Netherlands
Antilles on this income. The result was something less than perfection
(i.e., taxes owed to the Netherlands Antilles), but it would pass muster
in court. However, if the transaction in Northern Indiana were
structured to reach a result that was too perfect (i.e., no taxes owed to
the Netherlands Antilles), the Tax Court would, in all likelihood, have
recharacterized the transaction as it did in Aiken Industries. As a
result, the tax planners in Northern Indiana lowered the claim by
making the result less perect.14
Id. at 353-55.
1
Id. at 354-55 ("The fact that the transaction [in Aiken Industries] was entirely
between related parties was important to our conclusion that it was void of any
'economic or business purpose."').
142

'44

Id. at 354.

141 Id. at

355.
In addition, in Northern Indiana, the Tax Court seemed to lower the proof
from the taxpayer to prevent recharacterization because the parties were unrelated.
16

In Aiken Industries,however, the Tax Court required higher proof from the taxpayer
to prevent recharacterization because the parties were related.
147 The government appealed the Tax Court's decision in Northern Indiana. On

appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Tax Court
writing that "[l]ooking at the record as a whole, we find that the Tax Court did not
clearly err by determining that Finance carried on sufficient business activity so as to
require recognition of its interest transactions with Taxpayer for tax purposes."
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B. Raising the Proof
A second method to avoid inviting a court to apply the Too
Perfect Theory to recharacterize a transaction is to raise the proof in
support of the perfect claim. A well-known series of cases in the
1950s and 1960s involving prepaid service income of accrual method
taxpayers illustrates this method. 8 In 1957, the Supreme Court
decided Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner.149 In this
case, Automobile Club of Michigan, an accrual method taxpayer,
received annual membership dues at the beginning of the membership
year. It allocated the dues pro rata over the membership year (onetwelfth to each month) thereby deferring their inclusion in income.
The government argued that Automobile Club of Michigan had to
include the dues in income at the time of receipt because it had a
claim of right without restriction as to their disposition.150 The
Supreme Court held that Automobile Club of Michigan's method of
allocating the dues over the membership year on a pro rata basis was
"purely artificial and bears no relation to the services which petitioner
[Automobile Club of Michigan] may in fact be called upon to render
for the member. 151 The Court further held that the government's
authority under section 446(b), requiring use of an accounting method
that clearly reflects income, did not exceed permissible limits. As a
result, Automobile Club of Michigan had to include the dues in
income upon receipt.
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided American

Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 506, 514 (1997).
148 The literature on the taxation of prepaid income is quite voluminous. See,
e.g.,

H. HANNA, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAX DEFERRAL: THE UNITED
41-45, 107-11 (2000); Jeffrey P. Cantrell et al., Notice 89-21
Crashes the Interest Rate Swap Party, 45 TAx NOTES 337 (Oct. 6, 1989); Alan Gunn,
Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REV. 1
(1984); Calvin H.Johnson, The Illegitimate "Earned" Requirement in Tax and Nontax
Accounting, 50 TAX L. REV. 373 (1995); Laurie L. Malman, Treatment of Prepaid
Income - Clear Reflection of Income or Muddied Waters, 37 TAx L. REV. 103 (1981);
Robert H. Scarborough, Payments in Advance of Performance, 69 TAXES 798 (1991);
Steven J. Willis, It's Time for Schlude to Go, 93 TAX NOTES 127 (Oct. 1, 2001).
149 353 U.S. 180
(1957).
150 Id. at 188-89.
151 Id. at 189.
152 Id. at 189-90. Section 446(b) provides, that "If no method of accounting has
CHRISTOPHER

STATES AND JAPAN

been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect
income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in
the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income." I.R.C. § 446(b).
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Automobile Ass'n v. United States."' In this case, involving another
automobile club on the accrual method of accounting, the taxpayer,
American Automobile Association, attempted to justify its pro rata
monthly allocation and inclusion of prepaid dues through statistical
evidence. American Automobile Association did not deny that its
accounting system was substantially identical to that of Automobile
Club of Michigan.
But, as the Court put it, American Automobile
Association argued:
[Automobile Club of] Michigan does not control this case
because of a difference in proof, i.e., that in this case the
record contains expert accounting testimony indicating that
the system used was in accord with generally accepted
accounting principles; that its proof of cost of member service
was detailed; and that the correlation between that cost and
the period of time over which the dues were credited as
income was shown and justified by proof of experience. 115
The Supreme Court held, however, that a finding by the trial court
that the method employed by American Automobile Association was
in accord with generally accepted accounting principles did not mean
"that for income tax purposes it so clearly reflects income as to be
binding on the Treasury.', 5 6 The Court further held:
Likewise, other findings merely reflecting statistical
computations of average monthly cost per member on a
group or pool basis are without determinate significance to
our decision that the federal revenue cannot, without
legislative consent and over objection of the Commissioner,
be made to depend upon average experience in rendering
performance and turning a profit. Indeed, such tabulations
themselves demonstrate the inadequacy from an income tax
standpoint of the pro rata method of allocating each year's
membership dues in equal monthly installments not in fact
related to the expenses incurred.

367 U.S. 687 (1961).
1 Id. at 691.
155

Id. (emphasis added).

151

Id. at 693.

157 Id.

The Supreme Court also noted that Congress enacted a provision in 1954,
section 452, that permitted deferral of prepaid income but repealed the provision the
very next year, in 1955, because of revenue concerns. Id. at 695. The Court wrote:
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As a result, even though American Automobile Association raised the
proof in support of its claim for deferral, it was unsuccessful and
therefore had to include the prepaid dues in income upon receipt.""
In 1963, two years after American Automobile Ass'n, the Supreme
Court decided Schlude v. Commissioner. In Schlude, the taxpayer, a
dance studio on the accrual method of accounting, received advance
payments from customers for future dance lessons. A customer had
to take the lessons within a designated period, but there was no
schedule of specific dates for the lessons. The dance studio included
the advance payments in income as a customer took lessons and
credited any remaining balance in income when the customer's right
to remaining lessons terminated upon the expiration of the time
period for taking the lessons. As a result, it appeared that the
taxpayer had overcome the difficulties identified by the Supreme

To say that, as to taxpayers using such systems, Congress was merely
declaring existing law when it adopted § 452 in 1954, and that it was merely
restoring unaffected the same prior law when it repealed the new section in
1955 for good reason, is a contradiction in itself, "varnishing nonsense with
the charm of sound." Instead of constituting a merely duplicative creation,
the fact is that § 452 for the first time specifically declared petitioner's
system of accounting to be acceptable for income tax purposes, and
overruled the long-standing position of the Commissioner and courts to the
contrary. And the repeal of the section the following year, upon insistence
by the Treasury that the proposed endorsement of such tax accounting
would have a disastrous impact on the Government's revenue, was just as
clearly a mandate from the Congress that petitioner's system was not
acceptable for tax purposes. To interpret its careful consideration of the
problem otherwise is to accuse the Congress of engaging in sciamachy.
Id. at 695-96.
'.8 About a month after the Supreme Court's decision
in American Automobile
Ass'n, Congress enacted section 456, permitting deferral of prepaid dues income for
certain membership organizations. Pub. L. No. 87-109, § l(a), 75 Stat. 152, 222 (1961).
Congress's action may have been in direct response to the Supreme Court's statement
in American Automobile Ass'n:
We must leave to the Congress the fashioning of a rule which, in any event,
must have wide ramifications. The Committees of the Congress have
standing committees expertly grounded in tax problems, with jurisdiction
covering the whole field of taxation and facilities for studying
considerations of policy as between the various taxpayers and the
necessities of the general revenues. The validity of the long-established
policy of the Court in deferring, where possible, to congressional
procedures in the tax field is clearly indicated in this case.
367 U.S. at 697. See also BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 106, 1 105.5.3.
159

372 U.S. 128 (1963).
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Court in Automobile Club of Michigan and American Automobile
Ass'n by keeping records on the lessons given to its customers and
thereby accurately measuring the amount of services rendered.
The Supreme Court held, however, that the dance studio had to
include the advance payments in income upon receipt because the
taxpayer's allocation method suffered from the same defect as the
taxpayers in Automobile Club of Michigan and American Automobile
Ass'n.16 ' The Court wrote:
The system employed here suffers from the very same vice,
for the studio sought to defer its cash receipts on the basis of
contracts which did not provide for lessons on fixed dates
after the taxable year, but left such dates to be arranged from
time to time by the instructor and his student. Under the
contracts, the student could arrange for some or all of the
additional lessons or could simply allow their rights under the
contracts to lapse. But even though the student did not
demand the remaining lessons, the contracts permitted the
studio to insist upon payment in accordance with the
obligations undertaken and to retain whatever prepayments
were made without restriction as to use and without
obligation of refund. At the end of each period, while the
number of lessons taught had been meticulously reflected, the
studio was uncertain whether none, some or all of the
remaining lessons would be rendered. Clearly, services were
rendered solely on demand in the fashion of the American
Automobile Association and Automobile Club of Michigan
162
cases.
Looking at the three Supreme Court cases, commonly referred to
as the Trilogy, it is fairly clear that the taxpayers in American
Automobile Ass'n and Schlude tried to raise the proof in support of
the claim of deferral to avoid the fate of the taxpayer in Automobile
Club of Michigan. They certainly did not lower the claim, as the
taxpayers continued to strive for deferral of advance payments for
services. Unfortunately for the taxpayers, the proof was not sufficient
for the Court to permit deferral.
In 1968, an accrual method taxpayer was able to raise the proof
high enough to convince a court that deferral of income was

161

See id. at 141 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 135.

16Z

Id. at 135-36.

160
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permissible for advance payments for services. In Artnell Co. v.
Commissioner," the taxpayer, the Chicago White Sox baseball team,
sold season tickets and single game tickets for future baseball games.
It also received revenues for broadcasting and televising future games
and from selling parking tickets. The taxpayer was on the accrual
method and its taxable year ended on May 31, 1962. As of May 31,
the taxpayer showed as deferred unearned income that portion of the
amount received for season tickets, single tickets, radio, television,
and parking tickets, allocable to games played after May 31.164 As the
games were played, the taxpayer included in income the amounts of
deferred unearned income allocated to each game. 16 The government
argued that the taxpayer must include the advance payments in
income upon receipt and "that deferral of income is a matter for
Congress to permit and, until Congress acts, deferral must be
disallowed.' 6 6 The Tax Court agreed with the government167
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding that there
must be situations in which deferral of income (from advance
payments for services) will so clearly reflect income that the Supreme
Court would find an abuse of discretion if the government rejected the
taxpayer's method of accounting.' The Seventh Circuit noted that in
the Trilogy, the government did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
deferral of income "where the time and extent of performance of
future services were uncertain."' 69 But the uncertainty in the Trilogy
was not present in Artnell."7 The baseball games were to be played on
a fixed schedule and, except for rain
dates, there was certainty as to
171
the time and extent of performance. As a result, the Seventh Circuit
remanded to the Tax Court to determine whether the Chicago White
112
Sox's method of accounting clearly reflected its income .

163

48 T.C. 411 (1967), rev'd and rem'd, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968), acq., 1968-2

C.B. 1.
164
165

48 T.C. 413-14.
Id. at 413. The Seventh Circuit stated that requiring the business to include

the entire amount of payment in income on receipt "tends to reflect an illusory or
partially illusory gain for the period of receipt." 400 F.2d at 983.
166 400 F.2d at 983.
167 48 T.C. at 419.
168 400 F.2d at 985.
169 Id. at 983-84.
170

Id. at 984.

171 Id.

("We would have no difficulty distinguishing the instant case in this

respect.").
Id. at 985.
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On remand, the Tax Court held that while the Chicago White
Sox's method of accounting did not perfectly match income and
expenses, the government's method did not either."' In fact, the
government's method did not match income and expenses nearly as
well as the Chicago White Sox's method. Therefore, the Tax Court
held that the Chicago White Sox acted properly in deferring its
income.174
C. False (orAlternative) Solution
A third method in avoiding the application of the Too Perfect
Theory is to provide a false (or alternative) solution so that a court
will uphold the claimed tax consequences of the transaction for a
United Parcel Services of America, Inc. v.
wrong reason.
Commissioner"' addressed the practice of UPS, a parcel delivery
company, of reimbursing customers up to $100 of declared value for
lost or damaged packages. For any loss in excess of a declared value
of $100, UPS would assume liability only if the customer paid twentyfive cents per additional $100 of declared value (the "excess value
charge"). UPS made a large profit on the excess value charges
because "it never came close to paying as much in claims as it
collected in charges, in part because of efforts it made to safeguard
and track excess-value shipments. 176
In 1983, UPS restructured its excess value charges plan to avoid
paying taxes on the profits. UPS formed a Bermuda subsidiary,
Overseas Partners, Ltd. (OPL) and then distributed the stock of OPL
173 29 T.C.M.

403, 406 (1970). The Tax Court noted that the neither the Chicago
White Sox nor the government offered "any expert testimony as to how sound
accounting principles should be applied in this case." Id. at 405. As a result, the
Chicago White Sox could have done a better job in raising the proof by presenting
expert testimony.
174 Id. at 406. More recently, another baseball team successfully argued before
the Tax Court that it should be permitted to defer its prepaid service income
(advances for season tickets and private suite reservations but not sponsor income).
See Tampa Bay Devil Rays, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.M. 394 (2002).
The government has permitted a very limited amount of deferral for prepaid
service income. See Rev. Proc. 2004-34, 2004-22 I.R.B. 991 (generally providing for a
one year deferral period). See also I.R.C. § 455 (prepaid subscription income); I.R.C.
§ 456 (prepaid dues income); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3 (as amended in 1994) (notional
principal contracts); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5 (as amended in 2001) (prepaid goods
income); Rev. Proc. 97-38, 1997-2 C.B. 479 (advance payment for multiyear service
warranty contract).
175 78 T.C.M. 262 (1999), rev'd and rem'd, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001).
176

254 F.3d at 1016.
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to the UPS shareholders as a taxable dividend. UPS also purchased
an insurance policy from National Union Fire Insurance Company
(National Union). Under this policy, UPS would pay premiums equal
to the excess value charges it collected from its customers, and
National Union assumed the liability for damage or loss of the excessvalue shipments. UPS, however, was responsible for administering
the customer claims under the policy.
National Union entered into a reinsurance agreement with OPL.
Under the agreement, OPL assumed National Union's liability with
respect to the excess-value shipments and in return received
premiums from National Union equal to the excess value payments
that National Union received from UPS (less commissions, fees, and
excise taxes).
As a result of the restructuring, UPS remitted monthly the excess
value charges it received, less claims paid, to National Union, which in
turn remitted the payments (less its commissions, fees, and excise
taxes) to OPL. In its 1984 tax return, UPS did not include income or
expenses from the excess value charges but merely deducted the fees
and commissions that National Union charged. The Service argued
that the excess value payments ultimately remitted to OPL had to be
included in UPS's gross income."
In a lengthy opinion, the Tax
Court agreed with the Service and also imposed penalties on UPS."'
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court and remanded the
action for further proceedings.'79 The Eleventh Circuit applied the
two-prong economic substance doctrine in upholding UPS's excess
value plan. 8 ' Under the first prong, the court concluded that the UPS
excess value plan had real economic effect because there was a real
insurance policy between UPS and National Union, and OPL was an
independent taxable entity not under UPS's control."'
Under the second prong of the economic substance doctrine, UPS
had to show a business purpose for the excess value plan. 82 The court
wrote that "a transaction has a 'business purpose,' when we are
talking about a going concern like UPS, as long as it figures in a bona
fide, profit-seeking business.' 8 3 The court found an adequate
" See 78 T.C.M. 262 (1999).
...See id.
179

See 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001).

Id. at 1018-20.
at 1018-19.
182 Id. at 1019-20.
1 ld. at 1019. The Eleventh Circuit stated that "[t]his concept of 'business
purpose' is a nccessary corollary to the venerable axiom that tax-planning is
180

181 Id.
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business purpose because the transaction simply altered the form of
an existing, bona fide business 19 More specifically, there was a real
business that gave the customers loss coverage and allowed UPS to
185
lower its liability exposure. The court remanded to the Tax Court to
consider the government's alternative arguments under the
reallocation provisions of sections 482 and 845.'"
Judge Kenneth Ryskamp dissented from the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion."" He wrote that the excess value plan was done solely with
tax avoidance in mind and with no legitimate, substantive business
reason. He noted that UPS advanced a number of explanations for
its plan to show a business purpose and that every one was rejected by
the Tax Court.189 UPS claimed that the plan was meant to avoid
application of state insurance laws; however, the evidence showed that
this was not a real concern and even if it was, federal preemption of
permissible." Id.
184 Id.

at 1020.

185Id.
186Id. Section 482 provides:

In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses, (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and
whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross
income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such
organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution,
apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or
businesses.
I.R.C. § 482.
Section 845 operates in a similar manner to section 482 although it is limited to
reinsurance agreements or contracts. In general, under section 845, the Secretary may
allocate between or among two or more related persons who are parties to a
reinsurance agreement, income, deductions, assets, reserves, credits, and other items
related to such agreement, recharacterize any such items, or make any other
adjustment, if the Secretary determines that such allocation, recharacterization, or
adjustment is necessary to reflect the proper amount, source, or character of the
taxable income of each such person. See I.R.C. § 845(a).
187 United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014, 1020-22
(11th Cir. 2001) (Ryskamp, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 1021.
189 Id. ("As the tax court articulated in great detail in its well-reasoned 114-page
opinion, the evidence in this case overwhelmingly demonstrates that UPS's
reinsurance arrangement with NUF [National Union] and OPL had no economic
significance or business purpose outside of UPS's desire to avoid federal income tax,
and was therefore a sham transaction.").
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state laws made the old plan legal.' 9 UPS argued that it intended for
OPL to become a full-line insurer. It was unnecessary, however, to
use EVC income to achieve that goal. 9 UPS also claimed that OPL
was a legitimate insurance company even though OPL charged a
"substantially inflated rate for EVCs."' 92
In an arm's length
transaction with a legitimate insurance company, the rates would have
been about half those charged by UPS and in turn passed on to
OPL.193 Judge Ryskamp concluded that the Tax Court was correct in
holding that no business purpose existed for the excess value plan. It
was done solely for tax avoidance purposes.
Judge Ryskamp implies that the majority of the Eleventh Circuit
was led down the wrong path by accepting the argument that UPS had
a business purpose for the excess value plan. More specifically, the
majority seemed to believe that the plan was implemented to avoid
state insurance laws, that OPL was to become a full-line insurer, and
that OPL was a legitimate insurance company. In other words, Judge
Ryskamp implies that the majority believed the false solution(s) that
UPS gave for the excess value plan. He and the Tax Court saw the
excess value plan for exactly what it was: a too perfect result done
solely for tax avoidance purposes.
D.

Combining Theories - Raising the Proofand False Solution

It is possible to combine two (or three) of the solutions to the
problem created by the Too Perfect Theory to avoid a
recharacterization. In IES Industries, Inc. v. United States,114 IES, an
electric utility company in Iowa, purchased American Depository
Receipts (ADRs) with dividend rights attached. 95 These transactions
were brought to IES's attention by Twenty-First Securities
Corporation, a securities broker in New York. After "some initial
investigation," IES signed on to the transactions.

190
191
192
193

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1021-22.

194 No.

C97-206, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22610 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 22,1999), affd in
part and rev'd in part,253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).
195

ADRs are publicly traded securities that represent shares of a foreign

corporation held in trust by a U.S. bank. 253 F.3d at 351. They are fully negotiable in

U.S. dollars with the owner of the ADR entitled to all dividends and capital gains
associated with the ADR. Id.
196

Id. at 352.
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Twenty-First Securities identified ADRs in which companies had
announced dividends. IES purchased these ADRs with a settlement
date before the record date for the dividend, so that IES would be
117
entitled to the dividend.
IES then promptly sold the ADRs with a
settlement date after the record date. As the court noted, "The
purchase and sale generally took place within hours of each other, and
sometimes in Amsterdam when the U.S. and European markets were
closed."'98
IES purchased the ADRs through a counterparty from taxexempt entities (such as pension funds). These entities were exempt
from U.S. tax but were subject to a 15% foreign withholding tax on
the dividends they received on the ADRs. Generally, a U.S. taxpayer
can credit any foreign tax against its U.S. tax liability;' 99 however, a
tax-exempt entity cannot benefit from a foreign tax credit because it
has no U.S. tax liability. As a result, IES bought the ADRs from the
tax-exempt entities so that it could utilize the foreign tax credits that
would otherwise go unused.
IES paid the market price plus 85% of the expected gross
dividends for the ADRs. After the record date, IES sold the ADRs
back to the counterparty at market price. As a result, IES sold the
ADRs for less than what it paid for them because the purchase price
included the rights to the dividend ("cum-dividend") and the
subsequent sales price reflected the market price of the ADRs
without the dividend rights ("ex-dividend"). IES thus incurred capital
losses, which it carried back to its previous tax years (1989 and 1990)
to offset capital gains and sought to obtain a refund of taxes from
those years.

20

In 1991 and 1992, IES reported gross dividend income on its
ADR transactions of almost $90.8 million, claimed a foreign tax credit
for the foreign taxes withheld on the dividends of over $13.5 million
($90.8 million times 15%), and recognized capital losses of almost
$82.8 million (which included commissions).
The Service denied IES's claim for a $26 million refund, and IES
sued in district court for the Northern District of Iowa. The district
court granted summary judgment for the government. The court

197

Dividends are paid on the payment date to those who own the stock on the

record date.
198
199

BLACK'S LAW
253 F.3d at 352.

DICTIONARY

400 (7th ed. 1999).

I.R.C. §§ 901-08.

'0' I.R.C. § 1212(a)(1) (noting that, generally, a corporation may carry a net
capital loss back three years and forward five years).
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wrote:
Having reviewed the nature of the ADR transactions in light
of the applicable law, it is clear the transactions did not
change IES's economic position except for the transactions
having resulted in the transfer of the claim to the foreign tax
credit to IES.
The court is satisfied that the ADR
transactions in this matter were shaped solely by tax
avoidance considerations, had no other practical economic
effect, and are properly disregarded for tax purposes.201
The district court easily recognized what IES was trying to do. There
is a reason why it was obvious: the ADR transactions were too
perfect. IES wanted the foreign tax credits from the tax-exempt
entities, and, as a result, the transaction was done solely for tax
avoidance purposes. There was no other reason why IES would
engage in such a transaction. 12 In fact, it was so obvious that the
district court granted summary judgment for the government.
IES appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reversed the judgment of the district court.' °3 The Eighth Circuit
determined that the ADR transactions resulted in a profit or
economic benefit to IES and therefore had economic substance.
The court reached this result by computing the profit using the gross
dividend income before the foreign taxes were withheld and not the
net dividend income (gross dividend income less foreign taxes
withheld). 205 If the court had used the net dividend income in
determining whether IES made a profit on the transaction, then the
transaction would in essence be a wash, as the net dividend income
almost exactly equaled the capital loss on the sale of the ADRs. By
using the gross dividend income, however, IES made a profit
approximately equal to the foreign taxes withheld on the gross
dividend income. As a result, the court concluded that the ADR
201 No.

C97-206, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22610, at *4-5 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 22,

1999), aff d in partand rev'd in part,253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).
202

See, e.g., David P. Hariton, The Compaq Case, Notice 98-5, and Tax Shelters:

The Theory is All Wrong, 94 TAX NoTEs 501 (Jan. 28, 2002); Daniel N. Shaviro &
David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner, 94

TAX NoTEs 511 (Jan. 28, 2002). But see William A. Klein & Kirk J. Stark, Compaq v.
Commissioner - Where is the Tax Arbitrage?,94 TAX NOTES 1335 (Mar. 11, 2002).
203 See 253 F.3d 350.
204 Id. at 353-54.
205 Id. at 354 (noting that "the economic benefit to IES was the amount
of the
gross dividend, before the foreign taxes were paid").
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transactions had economic substance.2 6
The court also addressed whether IES met the business purpose
test with respect to the ADR transactions."" Both IES and the
Service discussed the risk of loss inherent in the transactions and the
court focused
on or
thisheaspect in.. determining
whether there was a
busi esspur
ose
208
business purpose for the transactions. The court noted that the risk
of loss may have been minimal, but that was because IES "did its
homework before engaging in the transactions. ,209 IES officials met
with Twenty-First representatives on two separate
occasions and
•
•/
a2101
studied the materials that Twenty-First provided.
IES also
consulted with its outside accountants and its securities counsel before
entering into the ADR transactions. 211
The court also compared IES's behavior with that of Compaq
212
Computer Corporation.
In Compaq Computer Corp. v.
211
Commissioner, the Tax Court held that Compaq Computer had no
business purpose for the ADR transactions into which it entered. The
Compaq Computer ADR transactions were almost identical to the
ADR transactions entered into by IES. The Eighth Circuit noted
Compaq Computer's "evaluation of the proposed transaction was less
than businesslike with [taxpayer's assistant treasurer] committing
[taxpayer] to this multimillion-dollar transaction based on one
meeting with Twenty-First and on his call to a Twenty-First
,214
reference."
IES, however, exercised good business judgment by
doing its own investigation and minimizing risk. In fact, IES rejected
some of the ADR transactions brought to it by Twenty-First and
made some trades when the U.S. markets were closed to minimize
risk. In contrast, Compaq Computer did no investigation or analysis
of risks before entering into its ADR transactions. As a result of
IES's analysis and investigation of the ADR transactions prior to
entering into them, the Eighth Circuit concluded that it exercised
good business judgment and therefore met the business purpose

206 Id.

Id. at 354-56.
Id. at 355. The government argued that the transactions were shams because
there was no risk of loss. Id.
207
208

2D9 Id.

Id.
Id.
212 Id.
21 113 T.C. 214 (1999), rev'd, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
214 IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d
at 355.
210
211
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test.215
IES argued that it was entitled to its claimed tax benefits from the
ADR transactions even though the tax benefits were, in a sense, too
perfect. The ADR transactions were economically a wash - the net
dividend income, which was the actual amount of dividends received
by IES, was almost exactly offset by the loss on the sale of the ADRs.
IES claimed the foreign tax credits with respect to the dividend
income, which would make the transactions very beneficial for tax
purposes although a wash for economic purposes.
IES succeeded in the Eighth Circuit, arguably, by having the court
buy into one (and possibly two) false solutions and by also raising the
proof with regard to the second (false) solution. First, the court
determined that IES made a profit on the transaction by including the
gross amount of the dividend in income and ignoring the foreign
income taxes. Because of some profit, the court concluded that the
transaction had economic substance. A number of commentators
believe that this line of analysis is simply wrong. 216 Creating some
profit in a transaction is easy - simply add in equity.2 1

In addition,

foreign income taxes are not the same as U.S. income taxes in certain
situations, because of economic incidence as well as the revenue effect
on the U.S. government. 218 Therefore, ignoring U.S. income taxes in
computing profit does not mean that foreign income taxes should also
be ignored.
The court then focused on risk to determine whether IES met the
215

Id. at 355-56.

216 See,

e.g., Hariton, supra note 202, at 502 ("The first holding [requiring profit
as measured before the imposition of foreign income taxes] is undeniably correct, but
it is a complete nonsequitur."); Shaviro & Weisbach, supra note 202, at 515
("Discussions of pre-tax profit, in some ways, are always surreal. The only
meaningful number is after-tax profits. Perhaps this is why the courts got so
confused.").
In I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334, the government announced that it
intended to issue regulations "that would apply an economic profit test to address
abusive tax-motivated transactions that generate foreign tax credits that can be used
to reduce residual U.S. tax on other foreign source income." Six years later, in early
2004, the government announced that it was abandoning the economic profit test. See
I.R.S. Notice 2004-19, 2004-11 I.R.B. 606.
217 See Hariton, supra note 202, at 509 ("And even if there
wasn't any profit in
these transactions, you can be sure that there will be in the next 30 transactions that
come before the courts, because adding in profit is like taking candy from a baby. All
it requires is that the taxpayer add some net equity to the transaction so that it is
effectively investing capital for a period of time.") (emphasis added).
21 See Shaviro & Weisbach, supra note 202, at 515.
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business purpose test. IES convinced the court that any risk was
minimal because it did its "homework" before entering into the ADR
transaction (unlike Compaq Computer). More specifically, IES
showed enough proof for its claim to the foreign tax credits by
detailing its analysis and investigation of the ADR transactions. To
the extent that risk is relevant, the court appears to be saying that risk
is evidence of a business purpose, but doing research to substantially
minimize or eliminate risk (as IES did) is also evidence of a business
purpose. That makes no sense. 219 Are we to understand that risk is
evidence of a business purpose, but so is the absence of risk?
In its appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Compaq Computer also won
with respect to its ADR transactions.22 ° Compaq Computer, however,
did not raise the proof in support of its claim. Rather, the Fifth
Circuit utilized a similar profit analysis and risk analysis, which are
arguably false solutions, that the Eighth Circuit utilized in IES
Industries.
In 1997, Congress enacted section 901(k), effectively ending IES
Industries and Compaq types of transactions involving dividend
stripping and foreign tax credits. 221 Congress utilized an entirely
different analysis than the Fifth and Eight Circuits. It focused on
ownership of the stock (or ADRs) and required the taxpayer to raise
the proof to satisfy its ownership by holding the stock at least sixteen
days within a thirty-one day period that includes the dividend record
date to qualify for the foreign tax credit.

219

See id. at 516 ("What the courts in Compaq and IES had to say about

economic risk was no less misguided than their discussion of pre-tax profit.").
22D Compaq

Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'g
113 T.C. 214 (1999). The Tax Court had upheld the notice of deficiency sent by the

Commissioner to Compaq and had also imposed an accuracy-related penalty for
negligence under section 6662.
221 See IES Indus., Inc. v. United States,
253 F.3d at 356 n.5. Congress has
recently expanded the principles of section 901(k) to include credits for gross basis

foreign withholding taxes with respect to any item of income or gain from property if
the taxpayer who receives the item of income or gain has not held the property for at
least sixteen days within a thirty-one day period. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 832, 118 Stat.
1418 (2004).
222 See IES Indus, 253 F.3d at 356, n.5; Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1053(a), 111
Stat. 788

(1997). When Congress originally enacted section 901(k) in 1997, it required the
taxpayer to hold the stock at least 16 days within a thirty day period that included the
dividend record date. Congress recently amended section 901(k) to change the thirty
day period to a thirty-one day period. Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 406(g)(1), 118 Stat. 1166
(2004).
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The first thing that is learned is that deception depends
entirely upon doing things in such a manner that it
seems there is no attempt at deception.
22
1
- DarielFitzkee
VI. THE Too PERFECT THEORY IN TAX PRACTICE TODAY

Almost all tax practitioners are familiar with the Too Perfect
Theory, although they may not realize it. In general, tax practitioners
know not to make a transaction too perfect or the government may
attempt to recharacterize the transaction.
Three well-known
examples illustrate the Too Perfect Theory in tax practice today and
how some tax practitioners have violated it at their peril.
Reasonable Compensation in an S Corporation

A.

A very common issue for tax practitioners arises with respect to
compensation for services of a shareholder/employee of an S
224

corporation.
For income tax purposes, the income of an S
corporation generally flows through the entity to each of its
shareholders. 2 ' Each shareholder will - pay226income taxes on his pro
rata share of the S corporation's income; however, this pro rata
223 See FITZKEE, supra note 59, at 224-25.
224See, e.g., JAMES S. EUSTICE & JOEL D. KuNTz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF S CORPORATIONS 11.02[5] (4th ed. 2001); A. Bruce Clements & Paul J. Streer,
How Low Can Owner-Employee Compensation Be Set to Save on Employment
Taxes?, 2 J. S CORP. TAX'N 37 (1990); Kirsten Harrington, Employment Taxes: What
Can the Small Businessman Do?, 10 AKRON TAX J. 61 (1993); Stephen R. Looney &
Richard B. Comiter, Reasonable Compensation: Dividends vs. Wages - A Reverse in
Positions, 7 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 364 (1991); Burgess J.W. Raby & William L.
Raby, When is Compensation Unreasonably Low?, 86 TAX NOTES 1255 (Feb. 28,
2000).
In 2002, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) issued
an audit report examining whether the Service was effectively identifying taxpayers
that were not reporting S corporation officer compensation. See TIGTA, The Internal
Revenue Service Does Not Always Address Subchapter S Corporation Officer
Compensation During Examinations, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 5, 2002) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 182-25). According to the report, eightyfour S corporation cases were reviewed, of which fifty-eight had officer distributions.
The issue was not addressed in thirteen of the fifty-eight cases that had officer
distributions. In cases reviewed, shareholders reported an average of only $5300 of
wages, while reporting an average distribution of $349,323.
225 I.R.C. § 1363.
226 I.R.C. § 1366.
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share of income is not subject to self-employment taxes. As a result,
it is generally very beneficial for the shareholder/employee of an S
corporation to avoid receiving compensation for services in the form
of wages from the S corporation because it will be subject to both
income taxes and employment taxes. The shareholder prefers
receiving distributions of money or property with respect to his stock.
An important issue arises as to how little compensation an S
corporation has to pay its shareholder/employee for services rendered.
If the S corporation pays no wages to its shareholder/employee
and simply distributes its earnings as dividends (in the corporate law
sense), it will provide
an ideal
result. But it is too perfect and may be
-- .
•
228
subject to recharacterizatton.
In fact, one judge has described this
ploy as "a subterfuge for reality., 229 Tax advisors appear to have
developed at least three possibilities to avoid a recharactization. The
first possibility is to have the S corporation pay a reasonable salary to
the shareholder/employee. Of course, "reasonable salary" implies a
wide range of salaries and, as a result, the salary is generally low but
reasonable and hopefully supportable. This would be an example of
reducing the claim. A second possibility is to argue that the
shareholder/employee performed no services or only minor services to
the corporation, providing supporting documentation, and that
therefore no (or very little) compensation for services is justified. 230
This would be an example of raising the proof. A third possibility is to
argue that the shareholder/employee is not really an employee but
rather an independent contractor (possibly done for retirement plan
227See I.R.C. § 1402; Ding v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that an S corporation shareholder must include a pro rata share of S corporation's
income in calculating gross income but not in calculating net income from selfemployment); Durando v. United States, 70 F.3d 548 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
pro rata share of income from an S corporation was not net earnings from selfemployment for purposes of Keogh plan deductions); Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 C.B.
225.
22.See, e.g., Dunn & Clark, P.A. v. Commissioner, No. 94-35562, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14334 (9th Cir. June 8, 1995); Radtke v. United States, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir.
1990); Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1990);
Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 141 (2001), afj'd sub
nom. Yeagle Drywall Co. v. Commissioner, No. 02-1132, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 27368
(3d Cir. Dec. 18, 2002); Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287; I.R.S. News Release IR2004-47, 2004 IRB LEXIS 148 (Apr. 5, 2004).
229 Veterinary Surgical Consultants, 117
T.C. at 145.
230 See Davis v. United States, No. 93-C-1173, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10725 (D.

Colo. July 15, 1994) (accepting taxpayer demonstration that her husband was not an
employee of the S corporation and also presentation of evidence as to the extent and
value of her services).
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purposes and also to have the S corporation avoid paying employment
taxes). 31 This would be an example of a false (or alternative)
solution.
B. Contingent Liability Tax Shelters
In more recent years, it appears that many tax advisors are
ignoring the Too Perfect Theory and structuring transactions with tax
results that are too perfect. A common transaction in the mid- and
late 1990s was the contingent liability tax shelter.232 Generally, in this
transaction, a high basis asset is transferred to a corporation in
exchange for stock of the transferee corporation, and the transferee
corporation's assumption of a contingent liability (such as an
environmental liability or liability for deferred compensation or other
13
deferred employee benefits).
The transferor may remain liable on
231 Taxpayers that have made the independent contractor argument have been

largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., Nu-Look Design, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 F.3d 290
(3d Cir. 2004); Dunn & Clark, P.A. v. Commissioner, No. 94-35562, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14334 (9th Cir. June 8, 1995); Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. United States, 918
F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1990); Veterinary Surgical Consultants P.C. v. Commissioner, 85
T.C.M. (CCH) 901 (2003), affd, No. 03-2733, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 4566 (3d Cir.
Mar. 10, 2004); Joseph M. Grey Pub. Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, 119 T C. 121
(2002), affd, No. 02-4417, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6662 (3d Cir. Apr. 7, 2004); Rev.
Rul. 82-83, 1982-1 C.B. 151.
In addition, the deduction under section 1402(a)(12) used in computing net
earnings from self-employment appears to be overstated, thereby treating
independent contractors slightly more favorably than employees. In computing net
earnings from self-employment for net earnings at or below the FICA wage base, the
net earnings from self-employment should be multiplied by 0.9289 (1/1.0765) rather
than by 0.9235 as provided in the statute. In computing net earnings from selfemployment for net earnings above the FICA wage base, the net earnings from selfemployment should be multiplied by 0.9857 (1/1.0145) rather than by 0.9235 as
provided in the statute. See I.R.C. § 1401; I.R.C. § 164(f).
232 The popularity of the contingent liability tax shelter may have been due, in
large part, to the issuance of Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, in November 1995. In
the ruling, the Service stated that, in a section 351 exchange, certain contingent
liabilities (i.e., environmental liabilities) assumed by the transferee from the
transferor would not be treated as liabilities for purposes of sections 357(c)(1)
(defining liabilities) and 358(d) (determining the transferor's basis in the stock
received in the section 351 exchange). See Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36. In
addition, the contingent liabilities assumed by the transferee were deductible as
business expenses under section 162 or were capital expenditures under section 263,
as appropriate, under the transferee's method of accounting. Id.
233 See I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730 (describing a contingent liability
tax
shelter, alerting taxpayers that losses generated by such a tax shelter will be
disallowed, and identifying it as a listed transaction). See also Rev. Proc. 2002-67,
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the underlying obligation. The basis and fair market value of the
transferred asset is generally only slightly greater than the contingent
liability. As a result, the stock received in the transaction will have
minimal value.
The transferor reports the exchange as a section 351
nonrecognition transaction. 214 The transferor's basis in the stock
received in the transaction
is a high exchanged basis unreduced by the
• •• 235
contingent liability.
The transferor then sells the transferee
corporation stock for its fair market value (usually within a relatively
short period of time after the exchange) and claims a tax loss in an
amount approximately equal to the contingent liability assumed by
the transferee corporation. In addition to the transferor's purported
2002-2 C.B. 733 (describing procedures for taxpayers who elect to participate in a
settlement initiative aimed at resolving contingent liability tax shelters similar to those
described in I.R.S. Notice 2001-17).
234 Section 351 generally provides that no gain or loss is recognized
if property is
transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock of
the corporation and, immediately after the exchange, the transferors are in control of
the corporation. I.R.C. § 351(a). "Control" means the ownership of stock possessing
at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
and at least 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the
corporation. I.R.C. § 368(c). The Service has ruled that if nonvoting stock is
outstanding, the transferors must own at least 80% of the total number of shares of
each class of nonvoting stock. See Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115.
235 Liabilities assumed by the transferee corporation are treated as money
received by the transferor. I.R.C. § 358(d)(1). Under certain circumstances, however,
liabilities assumed by a transferee corporation in a section 351 exchange are not
treated as money received by the transferor and thus do not reduce the basis of the
stock received in the exchange. I.R.C. §§ 358(d)(2), 357(c)(3). Liabilities that fall
within this exception are those the payment of which would give rise to a deduction.
I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)(A). However, the exception does not apply to liabilities that
resulted in the creation of, or an increase in, the basis of any property. I.R.C. §
357(c)(3)(B).
In 2000, Congress enacted section 358(h), which requires that the basis of
property received in a nonrecognition exchange, such as a section 351 exchange, be
reduced (but not below its fair market value) by liabilities assumed by another person
as part of the exchange and not taken into account under section 358(d). See Pub. L.
No. 106-554, § 309(a), 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). Exceptions were provided for a liability
if "the trade or business with which the liability is associated is transferred to the
person assuming the liability as part of the exchange, or substantially all of the assets
with which the liability is associated are transferred to the person assuming the
liability as part of the exchange." I.R.C. § 358(h)(2). The term "liability" is defined
to "include any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment, without regard to
whether the obligation is otherwise taken into account" under the tax laws. I.R.C.
§ 358(h)(3). Section 358(h) is effective for assumptions of liability after October 18,
1999.
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loss on the stock sale, the transferee corporation may claim a
deduction with respect to payments on the contingent liability. 236 The
Service has identified the contingent liability tax shelter as a listed
transaction.237

There are at least two aspects of the contingent liability tax
shelter that can lead an observer to conclude that the transaction is
too perfect. First, the closer the amount of the contingent liability is
to the fair market value of the transferred asset, the more perfect the
transaction becomes. Second, the more quickly the transferor sells
the transferee stock, the more perfect the transaction becomes,
because one of the main reasons for entering into a contingent liability
tax shelter is for the transferor to accelerate a loss or deduction (as
well as to duplicate a loss or deduction).
One of many corporations that entered into contingent liability
tax shelters in the mid-1990s was Enron. 38 As is now well known,
236 Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36.
237 See I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730; I.R.S. Notice 2004-67,
2004-41

I.R.B. 600. A listed transaction means that taxpayers may need to disclose their
participation in these transactions as prescribed in Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4, promoters
(or other persons responsible for registering tax shelter transactions) may need to
register these transactions under Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2, and material advisors must
maintain lists of investors and other information with respect to these listed
transactions pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1. See I.R.S. Notice 2004-67, 2004-41
I.R.B. 600. After the issuance of IRS Notice 2004-67, Congress enacted a number of
provisions, including enhanced penalties, applicable to taxpayers and material
advisors with respect to listed and reportable transactions. See Pub. L. No. 108-357,
§§ 811-22, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
238 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., 1 REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORP. AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX

118-35 (Joint Comm.
See also SECOND INTERIM REPORT OF
NEAL BATSON, COURT APPOINTED EXAMINER, at 87-94, Appendix J, In re Enron
Corp., No. 01 -16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003).
On February 15, 2002, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, represented by
Senators Max Baucus (then chair) and Charles Grassley (ranking member), directed
that the staff of the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation investigate Enron and its
related entities on issues relating to federal income tax laws. See JCT ENRON REPORT
at 1. Almost exactly one year after the directive from the Senate Finance Committee,
the Joint Committee released its Enron report on February 13, 2003. The report is
over 2700 pages and is contained in three volumes.
Another well-known company, Black & Decker Corporation (B & D), also
entered into a contingent liability tax shelter in the 1990s. In 1998, B & D sold three
of its businesses, generating a large amount of capital gains. That same year, B & D
created Black & Decker Healthcare Management, Inc. (BDHMI), transferring $561
million along with $560 million in contingent employee healthcare claims in exchange
AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Print 2003) [hereinafter JCT ENRON

REPORT].
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Enron is a Houston-based energy and commodities trading company,
which in 2001 was the seventh largest U.S. company, according to
Fortune magazine.239 Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2,
2001, which, at that time, was the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history."O
From 1995 to 2001, Enron planned twelve structured or taxmotivated transactions.24 ' Eleven of them were actually implemented
during this time, while the twelfth was planned but was never carried
out due to the bankruptcy filing in early December 2001 .242 The first

for newly issued stock of BDHMI. Later that year, B & D sold the BDHMI stock to
a third party for $1 million, reporting a capital loss of $560 million ($561 million basis
less $1 million amount realized).
B & D used the large capital loss to offset the large amount of capital gains for
the year, carrying the excess losses back and then forward. B & D sued for a refund
of federal taxes in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland in the amount of
$57,358,030 relating to the contingent liability tax shelter it entered into in 1998. The
government moved for summary judgment, arguing that the contingent liabilities are
not deductible to BDHMI but rather to B & D. As a result, B & D should have
reduced its basis in BDHMI stock by $560 million to $1 million. The District Court
denied the government's motion for summary judgment. See Black & Decker Corp.
v. United States, No. WDQ-02-2070, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17351 (D. Md. Aug. 3,
2004). In an opinion dated October 22, 2004 (modifying an opinion dated October 20,
2004), the District Court granted summary judgment to B & D, holding that the
transaction had economic substance despite B & D's concession that "tax avoidance
was its sole motivation." See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d
621,623 (D. Md. 2004).
See also Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. C1. 716 (2004) (holding for
the taxpayer in its use of a contingent liability tax shelter).
239See JCT ENRON REPORT, supranote 238, at 58.
240Id. (Enron's bankruptcy was eclipsed as the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history
by WorldCom's bankruptcy on July 21, 2002).
241These twelve tax-motivated transactions came to the attention of the staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation through an article in the Washington Post dated
May 22, 2002. See JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 238, at 50 n.42 (referencing April
Witt & Peter Behr, Enron's Other Strategy: Taxes; Internal Papers Reveal How
Complex Deals Boosted Profits by $1 Billion, WASH. POST, May 22, 2002, at Al).
Robert Hermann, who was former general tax counsel (head of taxes) at Enron,
gave an interview to the Washington Post in which he discussed the twelve tax
motivated transactions. As a result, the Joint Committee interviewed Mr. Hermann,
as well as requesting documents from Enron and discussing tax issues with a number
of current and former Enron employees regarding these twelve transactions.
Within Enron's tax group was a subgroup referred to as the Structured
Transactions Group. See JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 238, at 102-07. It planned
and structured most of the tax-motivated transactions, and named many of them after
hurricanes or golf courses.
242See JCTENRON REPORT, supranote 238, at 104.
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of the twelve tax-motivated transactions was named Project Tanya.243
44
Arthur Andersen brought Project Tanya to Enron in August 1995.'
Enron had a large capital gain during 1995 (from the sale of stock of
245
Enron Oil & Gas) and wanted to avoid paying tax on that gain.
Arthur Andersen devised a transaction to create a large capital loss to
241
offset the capital gain.
Enron entered into Project Tanya in December 1995 by
transferring two intercompany promissory notes to Enron
Management, Inc., a wholly owned Enron subsidiary. 24 Enron had a
basis in the first note (a twenty-year promissory note) of $120.84
million and a basis in the second note (a ten-year promissory note) of
$67.7 million. 24' Enron Management, Inc. also assumed certain
contingent liabilities of Enron: deferred compensation obligations of
$67.7 million and post-retirement medical, life insurance, and
executive death benefit obligations of $120.8 million. 249 In return,
Enron received twenty shares of a newly created class of voting
preferred stock, which represented $40,000 of Enron Management
Inc.'s net equity. 20 Enron's basis in the twenty shares was $188.555
million.2
Several weeks later, Enron sold the twenty shares of voting
preferred stock to two of its employees, who were officers in Enron's
Human Resources Department, for $40,000, recognizing a capital loss
of $188.515 million.252 It was anticipated that in 2002 Enron
Management, Inc. would be liquidated into Enron and therefore the

243
24
245

Id. at 118-23.
Id. at 119.
Id.

2,6 Id. A corporation's capital losses may only be used to offset its capital gains.

I.R.C. § 1211(a). Any excess loss may be carried back three years and forward five
years. I.R.C. § 1212(a).
247 See JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 238, at
120.
248
249

2

Id.

Id.
Id. The preferred stock provided for a 9% annual dividend and "was entitled

to three percent of any increase in Enron Management, Inc.'s net equity up to a
maximum redemption value of $340,000." Id.
25' This was equal to the sum of the tax bases of the two notes that Enron
contributed to Enron Management, Inc. ($120.84 million plus $67.7 million). Id.
252 The shares were offered to the officers in Enron's Human Resources
Department because of their "cost-management knowledge and expertise regarding
the various pension and deferred compensation liabilities contributed to Enron
Management, Inc." Id. at 120 n.254.
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contingent liabilities would return to Enron.253 Enron paid Arthur
Andersen approximately $500,000 for this transaction.254
Project Tanya took place in December, which was the end of
Enron's taxable year. It had to be done by the end of the year so as to
offset the large capital gain that Enron had for the year."5 Focusing
on two factors that lead to perfection (the amount of the contingent
liability approximating the fair market value of the transferred asset
and the timing of the sale of the transferee corporation stock), Enron
appears to have made the transaction almost perfect. The contingent
liabilities totaled $188.515 million and the transferred assets had a
value (and basis) of $188.555 million, a difference of only $40,000.
This difference is 2/100ths of 1% (.0002) of the total value of the
transferred assets ($40,000/$188,555,000). In addition, Enron only
held the
preferred
$188515
.
.stock for
256 several weeks before selling it for a
$188.515 million capital loss.
Project Tanya is a fairly straightforward example of a transaction
that was done for tax avoidance reasons with no business purpose. In
fact, according to an Arthur Andersen memo, "the biggest issue to be
resolved [is the] business purpose for [Enron Management, Inc.]
managing these [contingent liabilities] items. ' 57
The original
transaction
contemplated
Enron
transferring
contingent
environmental liabilities, but Enron did not have such liabilities.
Instead, Enron transferred contingent deferred compensation and
post-retirement benefit obligations with the purported business
purpose "to provide an incentive for human resource personnel to
manage the deferred compensation and post-retirement benefit
obligations by allowing the employees to share in the successes that
may result from their management efforts."' 5 9
One way of viewing Enron's purported business purpose is that it
was simply providing an alternative or false solution as to the purpose
of the transaction. The real purpose was nothing more than tax
avoidance, yet Enron claimed incentives for human resource
Id. at 121.
Id. at 123. Arthur Anderson promoted the transaction to Enron and also
provided a "more likely than not" tax opinion letter. Id.
2S Id. at 119.
26 The Service reviewed Project Tanya in its audit
of Enron's 1995 consolidated
tax return and allowed the $188.515 million short-term capital loss. Id. at 123.
117 Id. at 120 (first alteration in original) (quoting
a memo from Robert P.
Palmquist of Arthur Andersen to Robert J. Hermann, dated October 27, 1995).
258 Id. at 119.
23
24

259

Id. at 120.
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personnel to be more efficient. Enron certainly did not try to reduce
the claim by making the transaction less perfect. In fact, the next year
Enron entered into Project Valor, which was essentially the same type
of transaction as Project Tanya.' 6° In Project Valor, Enron created a
capital loss of $235 million in December 1996, which it again used to
offset a large capital gain it had for the year.2 6' As a result, rather than
reducing the claim, Enron increased the stakes (utilizing the same
claim) from a $188 million capital loss in 1995 to a $235 million capital
loss in 1996.262
C. SC2 Transactions

Another tax-motivated transaction has recently come to light and
drawn significant attention: the SC2 transaction.2 6 3 KPMG marketed
the SC2 transaction for about eighteen months from March 2000 to
September 2001.264 Generally, in such a transaction, an individual who
owns 100% of a profitable S corporation donates shares of the Scorporation stock to a qualifying charity to shelter income and also to
take a charitable contribution deduction. 26' The first step of the
transaction is to have the S corporation issue non-voting shares of
stock to the individual-shareholder that may typically equal nine times
the total number of outstanding shares of stock. 266 Thus, if the S
corporation has 100 shares of voting stock outstanding, it will issue

900 shares of non-voting stock. 267 The S corporation also issues
warrants to the individual-shareholder to purchase a substantial

260

Id. at 124-28. Arthur Andersen provided a "more likely than not" tax opinion

letter and was paid a fee of approximately $100,000. Id. at 127.
261 Id. at 124.
2 At the time of the release of the Joint Committee on Taxation Enron report
in February 2003, the Service was still in the process of auditing Enron's 1996
consolidated tax return. Id. at .128.
263 See MINORITY STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, U.S. TAX SHELTER
INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS,

S. Prt. No. 108-34, at 122-25 (2003) [hereinafter PSI

REPORT].

SC2 stands for S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy. See id. at 6 n.8.
264

Id. at 122.

265

Id. at 122-25.

266 Id. at 122.

An S corporation is only permitted to have one class of stock.
I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). A difference in voting rights among the shares of common
stock is not treated as a second class of stock. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(4).
267 See PSI REPORT, supra note 263, at 122.
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number of shares of the S corporation 2 8 The S corporation also
passes a resolution limiting or suspending distributions of money (or
property) for a period of time generally equal to the time that the
charity will own the S corporation stock.
The individual-shareholder donates the non-voting shares of stock
to a charitable organization that is not taxed on unrelated business
income. 70 As a result, the charity owns 90% of stock of the S
corporation, and therefore 90% of the taxable
income of the S
. • 271
corporation flows through to the charity.
The individualshareholder takes a charitable deduction equal to the fair market
value of the non-voting shares, which generally have a low fair market
value because
of the existence of the warrants and the lack of voting
272
power.
At the time of the donation, the S corporation and charity
enter into a redemption agreement allowing the charity to require the
S corporation to buy back the non-voting shares at fair market value
after a specified period of time (for example, two or three years).273
During the two or three years that the charity owns the nonvoting shares, the S corporation makes no distributions of money.274
As a result, the charity is allocated 90% of the taxable income of the S
corporation, which goes untaxed, even though it receives no
distributions of money. After the period specified in the redemption
agreement, the charity sells the non-voting shares back to the S
corporation for fair market value."' The individual-shareholder now
owns 100% of the S corporation's outstanding shares.
The S
corporation then distributes money to the individual-shareholder.
The end result is that 90% of the income of the S corporation is
untaxed each year that the charity owns the non-voting shares. The

28

Id. (giving an example of 7000 warrants).

269

Id.

...Id. at 122-23. In the report, PSI identified two charitable organizations that
had participated in SC2 transactions: Los Angeles Department of Fire and Police
Pension System and the Austin Fire Relief and Retirement Fund. Id. at 65 & n.206.
271I.R.C. § 1377(a)(1).
272 I.R.C. § 170.
273 See PSI REPORT, supra note 263, at 123. The individual-shareholder
also
pledges to donate an additional amount to the charity in the event that the shares'
value decreases. Id.

Id.
Id. If the charity does not want to sell the non-voting shares back to the S
corporation, then the individual-shareholder exercises the warrants, substantially
diluting the value of the non-voting shares held by the charity. Id.
276 Id.
274
275
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individual-shareholder is taxed at long-term capital gains rate when
receiving distributions from the S corporation, thereby deferring and
27
reducing the rate of taxes paid on the income of the S corporation.
In addition, the individual-shareholder claims a charitable deduction
for the donation of the non-voting shares to the charity in the year the
donation was made.
There are several aspects to this transaction that can lead an
observer to conclude that it is too perfect. First, the allocation of
income between the charity and the individual-shareholder is
important to analyze. KPMG allocated 90% of the income of the S
corporation to the charity and only 10% of the income to the
individual-shareholder. The larger the percentage of taxable income
(with no corresponding economic income) allocated to the charity, the
more the transaction looks too perfect. A second factor to analyze is
the amount of distributions made during the time that the charity is a
shareholder.
KPMG structured the transaction so that no
distributions were made by the S corporation to the charity owning
the shares - this is as perfect as it gets. An additional factor is the
type of charity that owns the non-voting shares. KPMG singled out
specific types of charities in which the individual-shareholder would
receive a charitable contribution deduction and the charity would not
be taxed on its share of the S corporation's income. This third factor
is a perfect result.
SC2 appears to be a straightforward example of a transaction that
was done solely for tax avoidance reasons with no business purpose.
In fact, KPMG tax professionals were apparently
•
278 concerned about the
lack of a business purpose for the transaction.
They asked why an
individual-shareholder, who wanted to make a cash donation to a
charity, would donate stock to the charity and then have the S
corporation buy the stock back instead of simply donating cash to the
charity.27 9 One commentator who prepared a written statement for
the PSI tax shelter hearing also questioned the business purpose for
the SC2 transaction, concluding that no business purpose (or
economic substance) existed for the transaction and that it was done
solely for tax avoidance purposes.
The Service has recently issued a
277

I.R.C. § 1368 (stating that the distribution of money first reduces the

individual-shareholder's basis in the S corporation stock and any excess is treated as
gain from the sale or exchange of property).
278

See PSI REPORT, supra note 263, at 43-44.

279

Id.

See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Michigan Law Professor Submits Testimony to
Senate Subpanel Hearing on Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 18, 2003)
28
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notice naming the SC2 transaction as a listed transaction.
VII. CONCLUSION

It is not uncommon for clients to tell tax lawyers that they are
magicians when it comes to the tax laws. And, in a sense, tax lawyers
are magicians in that they are able to structure transactions in a
manner to minimize taxes, in many cases, to the complete
bewilderment of their clients. Tax lawyers are constantly striving to
structure transactions in ways that will withstand scrutiny from both
the government and the courts. Experienced and well-informed tax
lawyers know, however, not to make a transaction too perfect. If the
results are too perfect, then the transaction may be recharacterized by
the government or the courts. In fact, for many years continuing until
the present day, tax lawyers have interpreted the Supreme Court's
decision in Gregory as creating or utilizing a business purpose
doctrine, an economic substance doctrine, a step transaction doctrine,
or even possibly a substance over form doctrine."' But perhaps
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 223-47) ("[T]he [SC2]
transaction lacks any non-tax economic substance.").
See also George K. Yin, Thoughts on Tax Shelters, 102 TAX NOTES 931, 932
(Feb. 9, 2004) ("[Clompounding the troublesome nature of these [SC2] shelters is
their manufactured quality"; in comparing the SC2 transaction to the Gregory case, at
least there was an underlying economic objective in Gregory, implying that no such
objective existed in the SC2 transaction); Calvin H. Johnson, Law Professor Says
Government 'Losing the War Against Tax Shelters,' TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 18,
2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 224-27) ("Full litigation
should show that as a matter of substance over form, the tax exempt shareholder is
not the real owner of the 90-99% [of the S corporation] or the income allocated to it
and is not the economic owner of the shares.").
"' See I.R.S. Notice 2004-30, 2004-17 I.R.B. 828 (stating that the Service intends
to challenge the purported tax benefits of the SC2 transaction based on various
theories, including the judicial doctrine of substance over form, as well arguing that
the warrants create a second class of stock thereby terminating the corporation's
status as an S corporation); see also I.R.S. Notice 2004-67, 2004-41 I.R.B. 600
(including the SC2 transaction within the current listed transactions).
28

See, e.g., BITrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 89, 1 1.05[2][c], at 1-21
("The

leading case in this area [business purpose doctrine] is Gregory v. Helvering, involving
a corporate reorganization...."); BiTTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 106, T 4.3.5, at 4-52
("The Gregory case, for example, is often cited in support of the business purpose and
substance-over-form doctrines, but it could be equally validly viewed as a step
transaction case; indeed, it iscited in Minnesota Tea in support of the 'devious path'
formula [of the step transaction doctrine]."); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle
of Economic Substance, 52 TAx LAW. 235, 241 (1999) ("The economic substance
doctrine was, if not formulated, then at least popularized by Learned Hand in the
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another doctrine or theory was created in Gregory - the Too Perfect
Theory. Gregory's transaction was too perfect, thereby leading the
Supreme Court to closely scrutinize her transaction and ultimately
conclude that only one interpretation explained the transaction: tax
avoidance, which was unacceptable to the Supreme Court.
A transaction that achieves results that are less than perfect will
generally have a greater chance of surviving government and judicial
scrutiny. As a result, Johnsson's advice for magicians to "imperfect"
certain tricks that are too perfect, thereby actually perfecting the trick,
is equally applicable to tax lawyers in structuring transactions.283
Some transactions need to be "imperfected" because they are too
perfect. Making the transaction less perfect will, in many cases,
actually strengthen the transaction so as to survive scrutiny from the
government and the courts. In fact, the government and the courts
should scrutinize transactions to determine if the results are too
perfect. In such instances, the government and the courts should
apply the various doctrines (e.g., business purpose, economic
substance, or sham transaction doctrines) to determine whether the
transaction should be recharacterized.

Second Circuit's 1934 decision of Gregory v. Helvering."); Joseph Isenbergh, Musings
on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 866 (1982) (book review)
("One of the cases that opened this path for the Treasury, and also perhaps the case
most widely invoked as a source of first principles on form and substance, is Helvering
v. Gregory.").
283 See supra notes 35-62 and accompanying text.
Of course, the client often

wants to avoid the expense of making a transaction more "imperfect," thereby leading
to tension, at times, between the tax lawyer and the client.

